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FoRewoRd
In 2005, the WorldFish Center embarked 
on a project to pilot test approaches to 
community-based fish culture (CBFC) in 
five countries. A previous study conducted 
between 1997-2000 demonstrated the 
potential of the approach in Bangladesh 
and Vietnam, although a greater 
understanding was needed regarding the 
social and instutional factors that would 
permit the development of CBFC in larger 
waterbodies to reach a greater number of 
beneficiaries. The five countries selected 
for dissemination of CBFC included 
Cambodia, Vietnam, China, Bangladesh 
and Mali, each very different in terms of 
history, politics, social-cultural context, 
aquaculture experience and development 
status. They appeared to share 
environmental characteristics, all having 
seasonally flooding areas and experience 
of rice-fish culture. 
A program of community organizing, fish 
stocking and harvesting was developed at 
selected locations in each country, where 
flood duration and amplitude was sufficient 
to support fish culture, and communities 
were willing to participate in the trials. The 
model developed in Bangladesh was to 
be introduced at each location, with the 
expectation that adaptations would be 
made to suit local conditions, based on the 
preferences of participating communites. 
Responsibility was given to national teams 
to develop many of the processes and 
procedures, with some aspects centralized 
to ensure a degree of internal consistency. 
As a result, the project capitalized on 
their knowledge and experience, ensuring 
that the fish culture model suited local 
preferences and met national priorities. 
The benefits of this approach are clear, 
including local ownership and capacity 
building, although it did necessarily give 
rise to dissimilarities in procedures and 
research outputs. In terms of innovation 
and learning, the advantages outweighed 
the disadvantages, as new models 
emerged, particularly in China and Mali, 
with significant potential for out-scaling. 
In the second year of implementation, 
uptake of the CBFC model was lower than 
anticipated, with communities in Vietnam 
and Bangladesh choosing to discontinue 
fish culture activities. Participants in 
Cambodia discontinued a year later. 
Alternative sites were selected in Vietnam 
and Bangladesh, with greater levels of 
success in the latter. In both Vietnam and 
Cambodia, the model did not become 
established. In China, the model was 
adapted to a locally preferred management 
model. In Mali, where aquaculture is 
rarely practiced, time was needed to 
work with participating communities 
leading ultimately to the completion of one 
fish culture cycle in the final year of the 
project, which yielded surprising results. In 
Cambodia, research efforts were diverted 
to exploring options for community-based 
fish refuges, to support national priorities 
and preferences. 
It was clear that local conditions were 
having a significant impact on uptake 
of the model in a way that had not been 
anticipated, and a new component was 
introduced to the project in the third 
year designed to understand the factors 
that were supporting or constraining 
community-based fish culture in each of 
the countries. This report presents the 
findings of  this study, based on a detailed 
evaluation undertaken in 2008-2009 in 
Cambodia, Vietnam and Bangladesh. 
Mali and China were not included in the 
study, both for reasons of time and cost, 
and due to the different path that project 
development had taken in each country. 
Details of project activities and outcomes 
in each country can be found in Russell 
et al. (2010) for Mali and Hong (2010) for 
China, and in Sheriff et al. (2010).
Although the research was conducted as 
consistently as possible across the three 
countries, using the same methodology in 
each location, the results are nonetheless 
also indicative of the differences encountered 
at each location. The diversity of reasons 
why CBFC worked and didn’t work led to 
difficulties in drawing conclusions across 
countries, or in quantifying results, with the 
exception of Vietnam where the number of 
communities involved in the study made 
quantification possible. The findings of the 
study are therefore primarily qualitative in 
ix ForeWord
nature, with figures provided relating to 
number of responses where available.  The 
issues raised by respondents participating 
in the study are grouped according to 
environmental conditions, socio-cultural 
conditions, livelihood context, institutional 
context, markets and economic viability, 
technical issues and implementation and 
incentives and disincentives for uptake and 
continuance. The report concludes with a 
summary of lessons learned. 
The purpose of the study, and this report, 
is to enrich our understanding of the 
conditions supporting or constraining 
an activity such as fish culture, carried 
out on a collective basis in a floodplain 
environment. 
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exeCutIVe summARy
During the rainy season in extensive 
river floodplains, floods render the land 
unavailable for crop production for several 
months. Traditionally these areas are 
common pool resources for fishing.  One 
option to increase water productivity in 
these flood prone areas is to integrate 
aquaculture in the production cycle, with 
concurrent or alternate rice-fish culture. 
Enclosed areas can be utilized for fish 
production to produce a crop of stocked 
fish alongside naturally occurring self-
recruited species using a community-
based management system. 
Enhanced water productivity is the basis for 
the community-based fish culture concept, 
which has been tested by the WorldFish 
Center and national research partners 
in five countries (Vietnam, Cambodia, 
Bangladesh, China and Mali) between 2005 
and 2010. The objective of the project was 
to develop locally appropriate models for 
fish culture in seasonal water bodies where 
the costs of individual aquaculture systems 
are prohibitive for poor people. Thus 
Community Based Fish Culture (CBFC) 
introduced local institutions for collective 
management of fish culture although the 
technical implementation of fish culture 
does not differ from individual production 
systems. 
The outcomes of the Community Based 
Fish Culture trials vary between and 
within countries, with successful trials 
but also some sites where fish culture 
activities were discontinued. The causes 
of discontinuance, and conversely, the 
factors supporting success, showed both 
similarities across countries, as well as 
context specificity. The WorldFish Center 
undertook a series of surveys in Bangladesh, 
Cambodia and Vietnam sites to understand 
the reasons underlying the adoption or the 
discontinuance of community based fish 
culture. 
A systematic approach was applied to 
understand the interactions and the 
role of different factors in adoption or 
discontinuance. The factors include 
the following themes: environmental 
conditions, socio-cultural conditions, 
livelihood context, institutional context, 
markets and economic viability, technical 
issues, implementation process and the 
incentives and disincentives for uptake 
and continuance. The survey included 
semi-structured interviews, focus group 
discussions and a topic checklist for open-
ended questioning and was conducted 
between October 2008 and March 2009 
in Vietnam, December 2008 and January 
2009 in Cambodia, and June and July 2009 
in Bangladesh. The survey sample included 
project beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries and 
local authorities.
Information about the historical, political 
and social context, as well as current 
policy environment and the status of 
fisheries and aquaculture at the national 
level were gathered from secondary 
sources, and supplemented with data 
from the field survey. Data were analysed 
by using a framework to stratify enabling 
and constraining factors at different levels: 
national, local, community, household 
and individual. For each level of analysis, 
information was classified for each factor, 
such as political and historical context, 
governance, social and economic factors, 
and environmental and technical factors. 
Research findings shows that the past 
experiences for collective action in Vietnam 
(failure of agricultural cooperatives) and 
Cambodia (Khmer Rouge regime and 
collectivisation) have a negative impact 
on the development of CBFC. Lack of 
social cohesion was reflected in some 
cases in communication problems and 
issues of trust, and in others in the 
desire to work individually. This aspect 
was particularly constraining in Vietnam 
and Cambodia. In Bangladesh, several 
successful past experiences of collective 
action for management of common pool 
resources, including fisheries, facilitated 
the introduction of community based fish 
culture.  
Changes in access rights and exclusion 
from common pool fisheries resources 
created tension between group members 
and with previous users of the area, 
especially in Vietnam and Cambodia. In 
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Bangladesh, previous users continued 
to have access the sites for fishing, thus 
limiting conflicts. In addition, benefits for 
the entire community, with access to cheap 
fish during the harvest period, facilitated the 
acceptance of the project by community 
members. 
Specific agro-ecological conditions at 
each site reflect different farming systems 
and water-management systems, which 
influence the technical implementation of 
projects and incentives for beneficiaries to 
develop CBFC.  In Bangladesh, the flooding 
period was longer compared to Vietnam 
and Cambodia, with deeper water levels 
allowing better conditions for fish growth. 
In Cambodia the absence of dikes required 
the creation of small fenced enclosures for 
fish culture. In those sites, the livelihood 
of villagers is also based on seasonal 
migration for off farm employment, which 
limited the participation of farmers in fish 
culture. In Bangladesh, groups included 
landless and fishers of local communities, 
creating large fish culture groups (more 
than 100 households) able to operate fish 
culture over large areas.
In Vietnam, other livelihood options or 
land use in the flooded area limited the 
participation of farmers. Benefits from fish 
culture were compared to other land use 
options and income generation activities. 
Villagers and specifically poor farmers 
preferred not to be bound to a project 
with daily or weekly duties, but rather be 
available for off-farm activities that can 
provide daily income. In Vietnam, where 
farmers do not have access to other 
land or agro-ecological system (unlike in 
Cambodia or Bangladesh), fish culture 
duration is limited between two rice crops, 
necessitating a previous agreement with 
rice farmers to decide the calendar for fish 
culture and rice culture. 
The support of local authorities was found 
to be a critical factor in the successful 
development of community-based fish 
culture.  Local authorities were instrumental 
in preventing illegal fishing and poaching, 
supporting the installation of water 
management infrastructure, encouraging 
participation in co-management, and 
promoting transparent management 
practices, Beneficiaries in Bangladesh 
cited the development of transparency 
as one of the most important factors 
enabling community based fish culture. 
A ‘floodplain management committee’, 
comprising local authorities, beneficiaries 
and local partners, closely monitored the 
fish culture group. In other countries such an 
institutional framework was not developed 
and lack of trust amongst participants 
was clearly stated as a constraint and 
reason for discontinuance in several cases.
Site size and distance between the 
culture site and the village were important 
contributing factors for successful fish 
culture together with appropriate size of 
fingerlings and robust structures to delimit 
the fish culture area. 
Economic returns and individual benefits 
were an important factor in Vietnam and 
Bangladesh but of a lower importance 
in Cambodia where food security was 
the main incentive driving participation 
in community-based fish culture. 
Comparative analysis between Vietnam 
and Bangladesh shows that the lower 
economic records found in Vietnam can 
mainly be attributed to marketing and local 
fish market characteristics, with a fish 
harvest concomitant with the bulk of wild 
fish harvest inducing a drop in fish price.
At the national and regional level, the 
development of the aquaculture sector 
played an important role for access to 
knowledge and inputs. In Cambodia the 
sector is not as well developed as it is in 
Vietnam and Bangladesh. This translated 
into differences in the availability of inputs, 
links to markets, capacity of government 
agencies to provide technical support, and 
infrastructure development. 
Lessons learned and recommendations 
to develop community based fish culture 
can be categorised into several domains 
such as governance, economic, social or 
technical. Recommendations relate to site 
selection characteristics (environmental 
and socio-economic context) and 
governance mechanisms to create an 
institutional setting that promotes trust 
and transparency. Choice of fish species, 
size of fingerlings, culture area and water 
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management structure are also important 
technical factors to take into account.
To succeed, CBFC has to integrate good 
governance and technical suitability 
with favorable socioeconomic and agro-
ecological conditions. CBFC is not 
approprate for all floodplains. Results 
from Cambodia and Vietnam confirm that 
a major focus in implementing CBFC is 
governance, while technical issues are 
also crucial. Difficult and complex as CBFC 
is, experience in Bangladesh shows that, 
where suitable, it can provide substantial 
benefits. 
1 inTroduCTion
1 IntRoduCtIon
Flood-prone ecosystems in South and 
Southeast Asia are traditionally farmed with 
deepwater rice followed by post-flood rice 
culture during the dry season. During the 
flood season, the same land is inundated, 
creating an open-access water body 
subject to multiple uses by multiple users. 
Fish production in these areas is based on 
the capture of wild fish. In these seasonal 
flood plains, fish are trapped in rice fields, 
reproduce and are harvested by farmer-
fishers or full-time fishers. These flooded 
areas cover about 4.5 million hectares in 
Bangladesh, and 1.2-1.4 million hectares 
(Catling 1992) is deeply flooded in the 
Mekong Delta of Vietnam and Cambodia 
for 4 to 6 months each year.
One option to improve access to protein 
and diversified income for local users 
and to improve water-use efficiency is to 
integrate fish culture into this system. A 
number of studies conducted in the 1980s 
tested the technical feasibility of culturing 
fish in seasonally flooded rice fields (Roy 
et al. 1990, Mukhopadhyay et al. 1992, 
Rothuis et al. 1998a, Rothuis et al. 1998b, 
Ali et al. 1998). These studies showed that 
fish production could be increased by 
more than 1 ton per hectare per year (t/ha/
yr) by stocking fish in flooded rice fields in 
individual plots. 
Based on these findings, the WorldFish 
Center implemented between 1997 
and 2000 on-farm experimental trials of 
community-based fish culture (CBFC) 
on the Ganges and Meghna floodplains 
of Bangladesh and the Red River and 
Mekong deltas in Vietnam (WorldFish 
2002). Farms are cultivated individually 
during the dry season, but during the flood 
season individual landholding boundaries 
disappear under the water, and water 
bodies and flooded rice field resources 
become common property. The project 
was based on the premise that production 
from these water bodies could be enhanced 
by stocking locally important fish species, 
providing communities with an additional 
source of income and an increased supply 
of affordable fish for sale or consumption 
(e.g., Dey and Prein 2003, IIRR 2000, 
Sinhababu et al. 1984). The results showed 
that fish production can be increased, with 
an average of 226 kilograms (kg)/ha in 
Vietnam and 863 kg/ha in Bangladesh, with 
a significant improvement of the household 
income (Dey et al. 2005). CBFC was found 
technically and economically sound and 
socially acceptable. However, the project 
concluded that further research was 
needed to understand how the institutional 
mechanisms needed to support fish culture 
differ in a range of different contexts. 
From 2005 to 2010, the Challenge Program 
on Water and Food project Community-
based Fish Culture in Seasonal Floodplains 
developed a series of trials to test this 
technology under different environmental 
and socioeconomic conditions. The objective 
of the project was to test the feasibility of this 
approach to improve water-use efficiency 
and provide benefits to the various users 
of seasonally flooded rice fields. Technical 
and economic aspects were monitored, and 
locally appropriate group arrangements for 
fish culture management, benefit sharing 
and resource access were tested. 
Although the technical and environmental 
aspects of culture-based fisheries in 
various countries are well documented (De 
Silva 2003, Nguyen et al. 2001, De Silva et 
al. 2006),  CBFC in seasonal floodplains is 
a relatively new concept, and the suitability 
of this approach in different contexts 
remains under question. The project aimed 
to address this issue by developing on-
farm trials in seasonally flooding areas with 
otherwise contrasting socioeconomic and 
natural environments. 
In this report, we focus on a study designed 
to understand the factors and conditons 
that support or constrain the feasibility and 
uptake of community-based fish culture in 
seasonal floodplains. The aim of the study 
is to contribute to knowledge on institutions 
for collective action, and the feasibility of 
community-based approaches to resource 
management, based on lessons learned in 
this 5-year project. The study also offers 
useful lessons for project implementation 
in the field of research-for-development.  
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The report begins with an introduction to the 
Community-based Fish Culture project and 
a description of the technical intervention. 
The second part of the report introduces 
the study to investigate the conditions for 
collective action in community-based fish 
culture, beginning with a presentation of 
the research approach and methodology. 
The third section presents the findings of 
the study. Finally, we present a synthesis 
of the factors supporing and constraining 
community-based fish culture, key lessons 
learned and recommendations. 
3 CommuniTy-Based Fish CulTure in seasonal Floodplains
2 CommunIty-BAsed FIsh CuLtuRe In seAsonAL 
 FLoodpLAIns 
The Community-Based Fish Culture 
in Seasonal Floodplains Project was 
implemented in collaboration with the 
Fishery Administration (FiA) in Cambodia, 
Research Institute of Aquaculture No. 2 
(RIA2) in Vietnam, Department of Fisheries 
(DoF) in Bangladesh, and commune and 
district agencies in all 3 countries. As 
the WorldFish Center maintains regional 
offices in both Bangladesh and Cambodia, 
project sites in these countries enjoyed 
more frequent visits and better follow up 
than did sites in Vietnam. In Bangladesh, 
the presence of two PhD students further 
increased the project presence at sites, 
as well as the presence of enumerators 
for data collection, which facilitated 
information transfer. 
2.1 SITE SELECTION AND 
STAKEHOLDERS 
Local partners and WorldFish selected sites 
together according to information collected 
from local authorities and extension 
services. Selection criteria included
the presence of community-based 
floodplain aquaculture or community 
willingness to develop it,
•	 the	absence	of	conflict	over	 the	use	of	
the water body,
•	 good	water-management	 infrastructure	
in Vietnam and Bangladesh, and
•	 sufficient	 flood	depth	and	 flood	period	
to support fish culture.
Secondary source information was 
reviewed and field visits were done in 2006, 
and one site was selected in Bangladesh 
and one Vietnam. In 2007, two more sites 
were selected in Bangladesh, as were three 
more sites in Vietnam, and project activity 
started in four villages in Cambodia. To 
compensate for discontinuance at three 
sites in Vietnam, local partners selected 
one more site in 2008. One site that 
discontinued in 2007 restarted in 2009 in 
a different setting. Table 1 shows the agro-
ecological context of project sites.
The project was implemented in different 
ways in each country, using small enclosures 
in Cambodia and large water bodies in 
Vietnam and Bangladesh (Tables 1 and 
2). Enclosures for fish culture in Cambodia 
are small for lack of embankments or 
natural delimitation as exists in Bangladesh 
and Vietnam. As enclosures depend on 
fencing, they cannot be large, which limits 
the number of beneficiaries.
In Bangladesh, individual project sites 
include more than one village and more 
than 100 beneficiaries, in contrast with 
those in Vietnam or Cambodia. This 
difference arises as several villages located 
around the water body house traditional 
users of the project area and those owning 
rice land within it. These two criteria were 
used to select the project beneficiaries. 
Bangladeshi beneficiaries are classified in 
three main groups — landowners, fishers 
and the landless — which determines their 
share of benefits and duties under the 
project (Tables 2, 3 and 4). 
No such distinctions are made in Cambodia 
or Vietnam. In Cambodia, landowners and 
other villagers are included in the project, 
and there is no specific restriction on 
joining. Where the project site is located on 
public land, any villager is invited to join. At 
three sites in Vietnam, only those who own 
land within the project area can join. At two 
other sites, those without land could join, 
but their numbers were not significant (three 
households in Truong Xuan hamlet and six 
in Hung Binh hamlet at the beginning of 
the project, but none after 1 month of fish 
culture).
Only at Beel Mail in Bangladesh was access 
to the site already restricted before the 
project began. In this case, only members 
of the local fishers’ society were able to 
fish in the beel. In Cambodia, part of the 
site at Chroy Poan was a private pond 
used for watering livestock and irrigating 
rice. Other sites in Vietnam, Cambodia and 
Bangladesh were in open access before 
the project. 
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table 1: Agro-ecological conditions project sites
Country site name Flood period land Tenure agro-
system
at site
agro-system 
outside* 
previous use 
of the area
Flood 
management
Bangladesh Beel Mail Jul-Dec Public land Dry season 
rice
Rainy season rice 
+ vegetable
Fishery 
(restricted 
access)
Sluice gates
Angrar Beel Jul-Dec Private land Dry season 
rice + fish trap 
pond
Rainy season rice 
+ vegetable
Fishery  - 
Kalmina Beel Jul-Dec Private land Dry season 
rice + fish trap 
pond
Rainy season rice 
+ vegetable
Fishery Culvert 
Cambodia Chroy Poan Aug – Nov Private land Rainy season 
rice
Dry season rice Irrigation, 
livestock 
-
Pom Eith Aug – Nov Private land Rainy season 
rice
Dry season rice Fishery Sluice gates
Thnal Kaeng Aug – Jan Public land - Rainy season rice Fishery, 
livestock, 
irrigation
Sluice gates
Potamon Aug – Jan Public land - Rainy season rice Fishery, 
livestock
-
Vietnam D1 Aug – Nov Private land Double rice 
crop
- Duck raising, 
fishery
Early Flood 
protection 
(embankment)
C2 Aug – Nov Private land Double rice 
crop
- Duck raising, 
fishery
Early Flood 
protection 
(embankment)
Trung Phu B Sept – Nov Private land Triple rice 
crop
- Duck raising, 
fishery, fish 
culture
Early Flood 
protection 
(embankment)
Hung Binh Sept – Nov Private land Triple rice 
crop
Orchard, sweet 
potato
Duck raising, 
fishery
Early Flood 
protection 
(embankment)
Truong Xuan Aug – Nov Private land Double rice 
crop
Planted forest fishery, lotus 
culture
Early Flood 
protection 
(embankment)
*:  represent the main agro-systems in a different land type (usually of higher elevation) used by villagers in the project sites
table 2: project stakeholders and institutional setting
Country site name area 
(ha)a
Beneficiary
householdsa
status of 
Beneficiaries 
Villages previous 
access 
rights
supporting
local agenciesc
institution 
Created
Bangladesh Beel Mail 40 124 Landowners,
fishers, &
landless
5 Restricted DoF + WorldFish + upazilla PIC + FMCd
Angrar Beel 31 171 5 Open DoF + WorldFish + upazilla PIC + FMC
Kalmina Beel 33 195  214 1 Open DoF + WorldFish + upazilla PIC + FMC
Cambodia Chroy Poan 1.0 16  7 Landowners & 
villagersb
1 Restricted/
open
FiA + WorldFish Committee
Pom Eith 2.5 21 1 Open FiA + WorldFish Committee
Thnal Kaeng 0.6 5 Villagers 1 Open FiA + WorldFish Committee
Potamon Open
Vietnam D1 65-19 34 to 30 and 11 Landowners 1 Open RIA2 + commune + district Committee
C2 48 28 Landowners 1 Open RIA2 + commune + district Committee
Trung Phu B 39 28 Landowners 1 Open RIA2 + commune + district Committee
Hung Binh 26 17 5 (2007) Landowners & 
villagers
1 Open RIA2 + commune + district Committee
Truong Xuan 90-120 13 and 7 (2009) Landowners & 
villagers
1 Open RIA2 + commune + district Committee
a Showing change from beginning of the project in 2006 to the end of the project in 2009.
b Villagers are households belonging to the village but owning land outside of the project area.
c DoF = Department of Fishery of Bangladesh, upazilla = subdistrict, FiA = Fishery Administration of Cambodia), 
RIA2 = Research Institute of Aquaculture No. 2 of Vietnam.
d PIC = project implementation committee, FMC = floodplain management committee.
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In Bangladesh, WorldFish and the district 
and subdistrict (upazilla) DoF were the 
main stakeholders for project technical 
support and monitoring production. 
Their role included creating at each site 
a floodplain management committee 
(FMC) composed of project beneficiaries 
and responsible for project management. 
The FMC was supervised by a project 
implementation committee (PIC) that 
included representatives of local authorities, 
WorldFish Center representatives and local 
partners in the form of the district DoF. FMC 
members are selected by beneficiaries. 
They operate under written regulations and 
are funded through a joint bank account 
managed by the president of the FMC and 
upazilla DoF officer. 
In Cambodia and Vietnam, there were no 
PICs, only committees with a structure 
similar to that of an FMC, including an 
elected president, vice-president, secretary 
and accountant. At four project sites 
in Vietnam, regulations are written and 
accessible to all beneficiaries, but this is 
not the case in Cambodia. In each country, 
the technical setting and organization of 
the collective group was decided together 
with beneficiaries and local partners.
In Vietnam, local authorities supported the 
improvement of embankments if necessary. 
The commune and district DoF monitored 
the project together with local partners 
RIA2. DoF and RIA2 provide technical 
and management support. In Cambodia, 
monitoring and technical support was 
provided by the local and central FiA. 
2.2 ORGANIzATION OF 
ACTIVITIES AND 
CONTRIBUTIONS
Groups are organized in many different 
ways according to their arrangement and 
activities. For example, in Cambodia all 
management and maintenance activities 
are carried out by all members, from 
fencing to harvest, without any payment. 
In addition, the technical setting includes 
fish feeding with locally collected food 
(duckweed of the Lemnoidae family, snails, 
insects, rice bran, etc.), and beneficiaries 
contribute to the project by providing 
bamboo for the enclosure or a financial 
contribution of $2.50-5.00 per member 
(Table 3).
In Vietnam, fish feeding was tried only 
once, using manufactured pellets during 
the nursing stage. Beneficiaries contribute 
labor for fencing and repairing dikes. At 
some sites, guarding and harvesting was 
a paid activity, while in others it was the 
duty of participants. Payment for guards 
and harvesters was necessitated by the 
lack of manpower or incentives for these 
activities. At D1 hamlet, this regulation 
changed in 2009, when the group became 
smaller, with only 11 members instead of 
30. In 2009, guarding and harvesting were 
member duties. Contributions  included a 
share of the lease money received from 
duck farmers.1
In Bangladesh activities were delegated to 
stakeholder groups, with fishers and the 
landless in charge of guarding and fencing. 
Fishers were also involved in harvesting, 
while landowners and moneylenders 
provided some monetary contribution 
to pay for labor and to lease public land. 
For a large group of beneficiaries, FMCs 
were subdivided into smaller groups with 
specific tasks such as stocking fingerlings 
and fencing, etc. 
2.3 BENEFIT-SHARING 
ARRANGEMENTS
Arrangements for sharing benefits vary from 
site to site. In Bangladesh, benefit shares 
were negotiated according to the type of 
beneficiary (Table 4). In contrast, benefits 
are shared equally among members in 
Cambodia and the Vietnamese hamlets 
of Truong Xuan, D1 (in 2009) and Hung 
Binh, or by owned area at other sites in 
Vietnam (Table 5). This last arrangement 
is possible only at sites where all project 
participants are landowners. Only at D1 
hamlet in Vietnam (and only in 2006 and 
2007) was a fixed amount of the benefit 
paid to the management committee to 
cover management costs. At all sites but 
Truong Xuan hamlet, self-recruited species 
were included in the total harvest.
1 Farmers rent their land to duck farmers for a month after the rice harvest.
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table 3: duties, activities and contributions of project beneficiaries  
Country Name Site Year
Duties, Activities and Contribution
Feeding Guarding Fencing-Earthwork Harvest Other
Bangladesha Beel Mail 2006-09 Fisher + Landless
(salary)
Fisher + Landless
(salary)
Fishers 
(share)
Lease amount
Angrar Beel 2007 Landowners +  
Landless
Outsiders 
(salary)
Landowners 
and landless
Salary for guards
2009 Fisher + Landless
(salary)
Fisher + Landless
(salary)
Fishers
(share)
Kalmina 
Beel
2007 to 2009 Fisher + Landless
(salary)
Fisher + Landless
(salary)
Fishers
(share)
Salary for guards
Cambodia Chroy 
Poan
2007 to 2008 All, in small 
groups
All, in small groups Collecting bamboo+ 
fencing
All Contribution :5 
USD/member
Pom Eith 2007 All, in small 
groups)
All, in small groups Collecting bamboo+ 
fencing
All Contribution :2.5 
USD/member
Thnal 
Kaeng
2007 All, in small 
groups)
All, in small groups Collecting bamboo+ 
fencing
All Contribution : 3 
USD/member
Potamon 2007 - Collecting bamboo+ 
fencing
Vietnam D1 2006 Fish feed pellets
for nursing
Security Team
(salary)
Contribution: nursery 
fencing, 
Beneficiaries
(salary)
Nursing (guard  
and  nursery) + 
dike rehabilitation 
by commune
2007 Security Team
(salary)
Beneficiaries
(salary)
2009 - All, small groups Fencing, pole All Modification of 
duties due to 
group size 
evolution
C2 2007 Security Team 
(salary)
Fencing, pole and 
dike reparation
Beneficiary + 
outsiders
 Duck raising 
income invested 
in the fish culture 
Dike rehabilitation 
by commune
Trung Phu 
B
2007 All, small groups Fencing, pole and 
dike reparation
All, 
according to 
owned area
10% of duck 
raising income 
invested in fish
Hung Binh 2007 All, individually All + 
outsiders
Nursing done by 
private 
entrepreneur
Truong 
Xuan
2008-09 All, small group Fencing, pole and 
dike reparation
All Harvest 
equipment 
provided by the 
group
a) in Bangladesh beneficiaries are classified according to their livelihood type: landowner, fishers and landless
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table 4: diversity and evolution of benefit sharing arrangements in the different sites in 
Bangladesh. 
Bangladesh
Beel mail
2006
Beel mail
2009
angrar Beel
2007
Kalmina Beel
2007-2008
Share of the Benefit for landowners Area Area Area Area
Landowners - - 20% 50%
Landowners - moneylenders 54% 38% - -
Ditch Owners - - 25% 15% of Culture Fish + 50% of Wild Fish
Fishers 42% 12% 10% 5%
Fisher - Money lenders - 50% - -
Landless 0% 0% 5% 5%
Revolving Funds (%) Already included 25% 25%
Management cost (%) - - 15% 5%
Donation to community (%) 4% - - 10%
Harvest cost (%)
Culture Fish 20% 20% 10-20% 10-15%
Self Recruiting Species (SRS) 50% 50% 50% 20-40%
Access to fishing ground Landless + fishers + landowners
a)  In Beel Mail the revolving fund necessary for the next season is already subtracted from the profit  and kept in the bank 
account before the benefit sharing
table 5: diversity and evolution of benefit sharing arrangements in the different sites in Vietnam 
and Cambodia. (In thnal kaeng and potamon site the benefit sharing arrangement were not 
defined.) 
Cambodia Vietnam
Chroy 
poan
pom eith d1 
2006-07
d1 
2009
C2 Trung phu B hung Binh Truong Xuan
Share of the 
Benefit
Membership Membership Area Membership Area Area Membership Membership
Landowners 
or 
beneficiaries
60% 55% 100% - 
revolving fund
100% - 
revolving fund
100% - 
revolving fund
100% - 
revolving fund
100%- 
revolving fund
Harvest Cost Duty Duty Salary Duty Salary  Duty Duty Duty
Revolving 
fund
15% 30% Reimbursement Reimbursement Reimbursement Reimbursement Reimbursement
Donation 10% 15% - - -
Management 
Cost
15% - 28 USD/
mb of the 
committee
- - - - -
Self 
Recruiting 
Species 
(SRS)
Included
in total 
harvest 
Included Included Included Included Included Included High water level 
: shared 
between 
landowners and 
beneficiaries;
Low water level: 
wild fish 
belongs to 
landowners
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In Cambodia, the sharing arrangement 
agreed at the start of the project included 
revolving funds, management costs (only in 
Chroy Poan village) and donations to the 
village. 
In Bangladesh, benefit-sharing arrangements 
varied between sites according to the land 
tenure of the water body. At Beel Mail, where 
public land is leased by the fishers’ society, 
fishers received a larger share of the net 
benefit than is the case at project sites 
that are entirely privately owned (Kalmina 
and Angrar beels). The benefit share was 
also proportional to the investment made 
in the lease. The fishers’ share at Beel 
Mail increased during the course of the 
project, with fishers investing in the lease 
amount. At all sites, the share includes 
revolving funds that has created financial 
autonomy for the fishers group since 
2007 (the project site was able to reinvest 
in fingerlings and fencing after 1 year of 
fish culture). At Kalmina and Angrar beel, 
financial autonomy was not reached, and 
the benefit-sharing arrangement continued 
to include revolving funds. At two sites, 
management costs were included in the 
bebefit sharing arragment, and at one site 
it further included a donation to religious 
authorities to renovate the mosque. One 
interesting point is that harvesting payment 
for fishers corresponds to a share of the 
harvested fish value, including both self-
recruited and cultured fish.
At Kalmina and Angrar beels the share for 
owners of ditches or trap ponds varied. At 
Kalmina Beel, owners received only the 
harvest cost, while at Angrar Beel ditch 
owners received the largest share of the 
total benefit (25%). At these two sites, 
fishers received 10% or 5% of the benefit 
and were paid for harvesting, while landless 
participants received 5% of the total benefit. 
At Beel Mail, landless participants did not 
receive any share of the benefit but were 
allowed to catch self-recruited species, as 
at other project sites. 
Benefit-sharing arrangements seem more 
complex in Bangladesh because of the 
diversity of stakeholders and the presence 
of trap ponds. However, revolving funds 
established to sustain fish culture at the end 
of the project reflect the sharing agreement 
only at Beel Mail, while at other sites savings 
from fish culture were insufficient to sustain 
fish culture activity into the next year. 
2.4 TECHNICAL SETTINGS AND 
RESULTS
The model is based on extensive fish 
polyculture (mainly carp, sometimes 
associated with silver barb, tilapia or 
snakehead) stocked in low densities at a 
maximum of 0.25 individuals per square 
meter in Bangladesh and Vietnam. In 
Cambodia, stocking densities were higher, 
at 1-2 individuals per square meter, because 
of the smaller cultured area.
Production and economic results were 
extremely variable at different sites (Table 
6). Operational costs included capital costs 
(fingerlings, fencing and harvesting gear), 
labor (harvesting and security teams at D1 
and C2 hamlets), land rent (at C2 hamlet 
and the government lease at Beel Mail), 
and management and nursing (at D1 and 
Hung Binh hamlets). Fence depreciation 
was not calculated as it only lasted for 
1 year. Dike maintenance, paid for by 
local authorities in Vietnam, was also not 
included. In Bangladesh, operational costs 
did not include the share of the harvesting 
cost. All costs and benefits are converted 
in US dollars using the prevailing exchange 
rate. Net returns are calculated as gross 
return from cultured and wild fish, less 
operational costs.
Variable costs in Vietnam depended on the 
involvement of beneficiaries in the different 
activities, with lower costs recorded at 
sites where harvesting and guarding is a 
beneficiary duty. In addition, the first year of 
production in D1 hamlet registered higher 
costs because of the use of manufactured 
pellets for nursing snakehead fingerlings. In 
Cambodia, the fingerling cost is extremely 
high because of high fingerling prices. 
Comparatively, costs are generally higher 
in Bangladesh than in Vietnam because of 
the land lease in the case of public land 
and investment in fencing and labor.
Productivity in Vietnam and Cambodia 
is low, at less than 300 kg/ha including 
self-recruited species, while productivity 
at one site in Bangladesh has exceeded 
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600 kg/ha. Sites in Bangladesh use large 
fingerlings, longer growth periods and 
selective harvesting to enable fish to be 
sold at the market size of 700 grams to 1 
kg per fish. In Vietnam, fish did not reach 
market size. Lower productivity at Kalmina 
and Angrar beels in 2007 was due to a 
short growth period at the first site and 
poaching at the second. The productivity 
differences in Vietnam and Cambodia 
reflect several constraints, including high 
waters exceeding the height of dikes or 
fences, poaching, presence of predatory 
fish, stocking of small fingerlings and short 
growout periods. Low productivity and high 
costs depressed economic net returns in 
Cambodia and Vietnam, yielding low or 
even negative economic results.
Economic results at Beel Mail and Kalmina 
Beel in Bangladesh in 2008 show that 
the model can be profitable. However, 
the results at Angrar Beel and project 
sites in Vietnam and Cambodia highlight 
the difficulties and uncertainties of CBFC 
in seasonal floodplains. Several sites 
discontinued or never even started, such 
as Potamon village in Cambodia, where 
the lack of incentives put a stop to project 
activities. Projects discontinued at two 
other sites in Cambodia, three sites in 
Vietnam and one site in Bangladesh. At 
Angrar Beel in Bangladesh, Chroy Poan 
village in Cambodia, and Truong Xuan 
and D1 hamlets in Vietnam, fish culture 
was discontinued and later started again 
after the intervention of local authorities 
and modification of aspects of fish culture 
management and group size.
The following analysis of the sites aims 
to show the reasons for success and 
discontinuance and explore the diversity of 
challenges faced by this community-based 
approach.
table 6: productivity and economic results (1usd = 17,429 Vietnamese dong or 4,074 Cambodian 
Riels or 68 Bangladeshi taka)
Country site name year enclosure Type stocking 
density
(ind/m2)
productivity 
kg/ha
Cost
usd/ha
net return
usd/ha
Bangladesh Beel Mail 2006 Dike – rice fields 0.16 636 325 119
2007 0.10 625 238 197
2008 0.12 691 262 244
Angrar Beel 2007 Dike – rice fields 0.11 215 152 28
Kalmina Beel 2007 Dike – rice fields 0.07 196 95 100
2008 0.11 382 130 185
Cambodia Chroy Poan 2007 Dike + fence - Rice fields and 
small reservoir
2 55 878 -790
Chroy Poan 2008 1 20 935 -935
Pom Eith 2007 Fence Rice fields 1.4 20-30 515 -515
Thnal Kaeng 2007 Fence Large reservoir 2 0 1,116 -1,116
Vietnam D1 2006 Dike – Rice Fields 0.25 173a 74 -4
2007 0.16 162 39 41
2009 Dike – Rice Fields (fence) 0.2 180 90 -27
C2 2007 Dike – Rice Fields (fence) 0.20 124 65 13
Trung Phu B 2007 Dike – Rice Fields 0.12 136 21 16
Hung Binh 2007 Dike – Rice Fields (fence) 0.15 92 50 -23
Truong Xuan 2008 Dike – Rice Fields (fence) 0.21 104b 31 -6
2009 Dike – Rice Fields (fence) 0.2 112c 32 -8
a) wild fish productivity not recorded
b) including 6.3 kg/ha Wild Fish harvested by the group and 31.2kg/ha Wild Fish estimated harvest by landowners when the 
water level was lower than rice field’s dike
c) including 9.1 kg/ha  of wild fish harvested by the group and 12.5 kg/ha estimated harvest by the landowners
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3.1 METHODOLOGY
RESEARCH APPROACH
Studies to understand community-based 
project efficiencies and constraints in 
floodplains and water bodies use a wide 
range of approaches. Culture-based 
fisheries in water bodies in Asia are well 
documented (De Silva 2003, Nguyen et al. 
2001, De Silva et al. 2006). These studies 
analyzed the effectiveness of this approach 
in terms of economic and technical 
factors. Saphakdy et al. (2009) document 
the diversity of community structure and 
benefit-sharing arrangements in culture-
based fisheries in Laos. In this last 
study, the diversity of rules of access to 
common resources and benefit sharing is 
explained by the socioeconomic context 
and household economy. Other studies 
integrate governance and socioeconomic 
factors, such as Lorenzen et al. (1998), 
which analyzes the effect on productivity 
of different access rules in culture-based 
fisheries in Laos. 
Access rules change with enclosure of 
water bodies under CBFC and can exclude 
previous users, causing conflicts, as 
described by Tubtim and Hirsch (2005) in 
Laos. In this study, a qualitative approach 
is used to describe the process and 
legitimization of property rights changes 
and their social consequences. The authors 
place the whole process in the national 
institutional and legal context. In addition 
to technical and economic aspects, the 
exclusion of previous resource users, 
access rules and institutional aspects 
need to be assessed. The policy and 
socioeconomic contexts can play important 
roles in the success or discontinuance of 
community-based action. 
The challenges in introducingcommunity-
based fishery management (CBFM) in 
the floodplains of Bangladesh are well 
described and analyzed by Thompson et al. 
(2003). The authors use data collected during 
the course of a long-term investigation into 
community-based fisheries managament 
at several sites in Bangladesh to 
understand the conditions of acceptance 
of such community-based approaches. 
The approach includes an institutional 
analysis framework (ICLARM and IFM 
1998) to examine local co-management 
and institutional arrangements together 
with close monitoring of the fish catch, 
and household interviews. The authors 
take into account institutional factors, 
including implementation processes, and 
technical factors to draw lessons from the 
community-based approach. 
Less well documented in the literature 
is the role of socio-historical context 
in understanding the factors that may 
motivate or constrain individuals or 
communities to adopt a new technology, 
particularly when adoption involves 
collective action and the pooling of 
common resources. Cambodia, Vietnam 
and China have, in their recent history, 
experienced events that have caused 
massive social, political and economic 
upheaval with important implications for 
the way in which people interact with one 
another, and for governance systems. 
Understanding the way in which these 
events have influenced the success or 
failure of community-approaches to fish 
culture has made a critical contribution 
to the analysis, and has led to important 
lessons learned for R4D. 
Compared with fisheries or even culture-
based fisheries, CBFC interacts strongly 
with agriculture. Flooded rice fields are 
used to culture fish. Interactions between 
aquaculture and agriculture can strongly 
influence acceptance or discontinuance 
of fish culture, as the same individuals 
pursue both activities on the same land 
at different times of the year. Considering 
how intimately aquaculture and agriculture 
interact, farming systems and agricultural 
policy need to be integrated into the CBFC 
approach.
3 CondItIons FoR CoLLeCtIVe ACtIon – the CBFC  
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In order to develop a full appreciation 
of the factors that may have led to the 
outcomes generated by the project, a 
research framework was developed to 
capture the many facets of influence 
affecting community-based action for 
fish culture (Figure  1). The framework 
guided the research to explore the role 
of the socio-ecological context, including 
historical background, livelihood profiles, 
policies, infrastructure, ecological 
aspects, in the development of CBFC; 
the factors governing incentives and 
motivation for participation, and the the 
role of the implementation process in the 
development of CBFC. These factors guide 
the presentation of the analysis, which is 
classified according to the following themes: 
environmental conditions, socio-cultural 
conditions, livelihood context, institutional 
context, markets and economic viability, 
technical issues and implementation and 
incentives and disincentives for uptake and 
continuance. 
Figure 1: Research framework for analysis of the socio-ecological context
political system and governance
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SITE SELECTION AND SAMPLE SIzE
The study covers 12 sites in Vietnam2, 
Cambodia3  and Bangladesh (Figures 2 
and 3). National partners at the Research 
Institute for Aquaculture No. 2 selected the 
sites. 
In Vietnam and Cambodia, more than 
half of the beneficiaries were interviewed 
at each site, as were at least 10 other 
households living nearby.4 Respondents 
included association leaders, secretaries 
and representatives, as well as long-term, 
recent and discontinued beneficiaries. 
Non-beneficiaries included landowners 
living adjacent to the fish culture area and 
those farming within the fish culture area 
but not involved in the project. Landless 
farmers living in the project area were also 
included.
As Bangladesh had larger sites, some 
including five villages and beneficiary 
groups of more than 100 households, a 
different approach used key informant 
interviews and focus group discussions 
with distinct stakeholder groups at each 
survey site: landowners, fishers and the 
landless, as well as the management group. 
Non-beneficiaries were not interviewed in 
Bangladesh because the high population 
density around the project sites would 
have required too large a sample of 
non-beneficiaries to ensure that it was 
representative. 
DATA COLLECTION
Data collection comprised both desk-based 
analysis and the collection of primary data. 
Information about the historical, political 
and social context, as well as current policy 
environment and the status of fisheries 
and aquaculture at the national level were 
gathered from secondary sources, and 
supplemented with data from the field 
survey. 
The survey comprised semi-structured 
interviews and a topic checklist for open-
ended questioning and was conducted in 
October 2008 and March 2009 in Vietnam, 
December 2008 and January 2009 in 
Cambodia, and June and July 2009 in 
Bangladesh. 
Semi-structured household interviews in 
Vietnam and Cambodia, and focus group 
discussions in Bangladesh with beneficiaries 
and other community members (Table 7), 
investigated the following topics
•	 the	 beneficiaries’	 incentives	 to	 join	 the	
project and their expectations; 
•	 constraints	to	community-based	
aquaculture and enabling factors;
•	 the	governance	and	institutional	setting	
of the community and its evolution since 
the beginning of the project;
•	 the	roles	of	local	partners	and	
government agencies; and
•	 the	 main	 impacts,	 both	 positive	 and	
negative, of the project.
Open-ended questions were addressed to 
project participants5 and other community 
members.6  More structured questions 
were asked at the individual household 
level to understand the economic 
opportunities at project sites and estimate 
operational costs, yields, gross returns and 
net returns of different land uses, including 
rice cropping and individual fish culture. 
The role of fisheries in livelihoods was 
also investigated to allow estimates of the 
importance of fisheries in term of income, 
catch and fishing ground locations. The 
economic importance of households’ off-
farm activities was also estimated. 
2 In Vietnam, two projects sites in An Giang and Dong Thap provinces that were implemented in 2006 but discontinued in 
2007 were not visited.
3 At Potamon in Cambodia the project was never implemented beyond preliminary meetings, so the number of beneficiaries 
is null. 
4 At Truong Xuan hamlet in Vietnam, only five non-beneficiary households were available for interviews.
5 For example: Why did you join the project? What are the challenges of developing CBFC? How is the group organized and 
what are its regulations? What is your opinion of group management and collective activities? What are the impacts of the 
project? What are the benefits of the project? Did the project cause any problems? What would you have liked to do 
differently?
6 For example: How did you learn about the project and what were you told about it? Why didn’t you join the project? How 
did you use your land during the project? Where did you fish during the project?
7 Sample questions: What were the criteria for site selection? Can you explain your role in the project? What are the 
challenges to developing CBFC?
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Figure 2: study sits in Bangladesh (gangetic delta)
The roles of local authorities and partners 
were investigated using semi-structured 
interviews to collect qualitative data.7 
Information on the agro-ecological context 
were collected from local institutions for 
better understanding of the context. The 
following data was collected:
•	 criteria	 for	 site	 selection	 used	 by	 local	
partners and authorities, as well as local 
authorities’ background and plans. 
•	 role	of	 local	authorities	and	partners	 in	
project implementation and how they 
introduced the project to beneficiaries.
•	 policy	 context	 for	 local	 and	 national	
agriculture and aquaculture 
development, with a special emphasis 
on policy for collective action; and
•	 hydrological	 data	 on	 flooding	 and	
water levels, land-use, flood-control 
infrastructure, and fish market price.
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Figure 3: study sites in Bangladesh (gangetic delta)
DATA PROCESSING AND ANALYSIS 
Household interviews provided qualitative 
information on incentives and enabling 
or constraining factors for CBFC 
development. Responses were grouped 
according to topic and survey site to 
show the relative importance of factors 
affecting CBFC adoption or discontinuance 
at each site. 
The collected data were analyzed using 
a framework to stratify enabling and 
constraining factors at different levels: 
national, local, community, household 
and individual. For each level of analysis, 
information was classified for each factor, 
such as political and historical context, 
governance, social and economic factors, 
and environmental and technical factors. 
Constraining and enabling factors were 
then ordered by relative importance in each 
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table 7: Community-Based Fish Culture project survey sites and household samplesa
District/Province Beneficiaries
(household)
Beneficiaries
Who Quit
(household)
Non- Beneficiaries
(household)
Local Authorities
Bangladesh
Beel Mail Rajshahi Landowners/ 
fishers/landless + 
key informants
District and subdistrict DoF
Angrar Beel Rangpur
Kalmina Beel Mymensingh
Cambodia
Chroy Poan Takeo 5 5 10
Provincial FiA, commune 
council
Pom Eith Takeo 9 11
Potamon Prey Veng 0 13 6 
Thnal Kaeng Prey Veng 4 14 
Vietnam
D1 hamlet Can Tho City 15 4 15 District DoF and commune 
officialsC2 hamlet Can Tho City 15 11 
Trung Phu B Can Tho City 16 16 
Hung Binh Vinh Long 5 3 16 
Truong Xuan Dong Thap 9 5b Provincial & district DoF 
and commune officials
DoF = Department of Fisheries, FiA = Fishery Administration.
a Site names in italics are those where activity discontinue or stopped for 1 year.
b The number of households was fewer than 10 due to members’ unavailability during the survey. 
category and each level of analysis. Another 
layer of analysis is added by developing a 
synthesis focusing on interaction between 
enabling and constraining factors at 
different scales. This approach allows us 
to propose models for developing CBFC by 
synthesizing the factors highlighted in this 
study.
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4 ReseARCh FIndIngs
4.1 HISTORICAL AND 
POLITICAL CONTEXT
INFLUENCE OF RECENT HISTORICAL 
EVENTS ON COLLECTIVE ACTION 
Examining recent historical events at a 
potential site for community-based fish 
culture can provide insights into the 
likelihood of uptake by a community 
of fish culture on a collective basis. 
Understanding the historical context is of 
particular importance in countries such 
as Cambodia and Vietnam, where recent 
history indicates that the introduction of 
collective action may be problematic. 
Bangladesh, Cambodia and Vietnam each 
have a different background concerning 
collective action, as the collectivization of 
the land and production under socialist 
regimes in Vietnam and Cambodia never 
occurred in Bangladesh.
In post-independence Vietnam in the 
1950’s, Communist ideology favoured 
land collectivization. Although relatively 
successful in the North, farmers in the South 
resisted collectivization and continued to 
farm individually. Agricultural collectivization 
in the Mekong Delta between 1975 and 
1981 was undermined by low adhesion 
to collectivist ideals by local farmers, who 
had only recently obtained rights to their 
land after decades of conflict with large 
landowners (Le Coq et al. 2004).
In Cambodia, agrarian reform implemented 
by the Khmer Rouge (1975-1979) transformed 
the landscape. Agrarian reform, land 
collectivization and drastic changes in rice 
cultivation techniques caused production to 
fall by 60% from 1970 to 1978 (Pillot 2007). 
After Vietnam deposed the Khmer Rouge 
regime, reconstruction attempted under 
the Vietnamese-supported administration 
was partly collective for rice culture through 
cooperatives and mutual help groups, but 
without much success due to intramural 
conflicts. Collectivization was rapidly 
abandoned in 1985 and land redistributed 
to households (Pillot 2007). 
More recently, other collective approaches 
to fisheries were developed in Bangladesh 
and Cambodia. In Bangladesh, 19 rivers 
and other water bodies came under 
community-based fishery management 
(CBFM) from 1996 to 2000, with 116 water 
bodies added later. CBFM included the 
development of local fishery management 
bodies, secure access rights for fishers, 
and training. Since 1990, during the third 
and fourth fishery projects, 250 community 
organizations have been developed for 
managing wetland fisheries in Bangladesh, 
involving both nongovernmental 
organizations and the DoF. 
CBFM is also promoted in Cambodia, 
notably by a royal decree of 29 May 2005 
and a sub-decree promulgated on 10 
June 2005, to empower communities 
and enhance the management and 
sustainability of fishery resources. In 2006, 
440 community-managed fisheries were 
in place. Since the late 1990s, more than 
100 community fish refuges have been 
developed through several projects with 
varying success. A recent statement from 
the prime minister requires each commune 
to develop a community fish refuge to 
enhance rice field fisheries. 
In Vietnam, community fish management 
and refuges are not developed, as most 
collective action is directed toward rice 
cooperatives, irrigation, drainage and 
pest management. Only a few sporadic 
collective aquaculture trials in floodplains 
have been implemented locally through 
provincial or district initiative. However, 
the technology was disseminated from 
experimental CBFC in 1999 and 2000 in 
Dong Thap and Tien Giang provinces to 
Can Tho and Vinh Long provinces. In Vinh 
Thanh District, aquaculture conducted 
by individuals or small groups of two or 
three households has been developed in 
200-300 ha of inundated rice fields since 
2004 with relative success. However, 
extensionists for CBFC have never, when 
interviewed, cited these past experiences 
as advantageous.
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Given the sensitivity of the issue, it is not, 
therefore, surprising, that the introduction 
of a community-based approach to fish 
culture, dependent on the collective use 
of land and water resources, should fail in 
Cambodia and southern Vietnam, although 
past experience of collective action at 
individual sites was not explicitly stated by 
respondents as a constraint to collective 
action. 
Recent historical events, such as enforced 
collective action under the Khmer Rouge 
in Cambodia, or the failure of collectivized 
agriculture in the Mekong Delta suggest that 
the introduction of fish culture on a collective 
basis may be sensitive and likely to see little 
or no uptake and adoption, or that there is 
a preference for individual culture systems. 
Under these conditions, there should be 
evidence of other strong incentives, such 
as limited alternative livelihood options (see 
4.5), before community-based fish culture 
is introduced. 
At the local level, communities have 
experienced different patterns of settlement 
and development with the potential 
to influence agricultural preferences, 
attitudes to land ownership and access, 
and social interactions within and outside 
the community. Both D1 and C2 hamlets 
in Vietnam were established in 1954, 
following the displacement of the Catholic 
minority from the north of Vietnam, who 
later settled in this area. Prior to settlement, 
the area was a wetland, not cultivated and 
affected by deep flooding during three 
to four months of the year. The Ngo Dinh 
Diem Government allocated 3 hectares 
of land to each household and developed 
canals and dikes to allow rice farming. Rice 
culture then expanded to other hamlets 
using deep water rice with a growth 
period of 180 days. At the same time the 
neighboring hamlet in Than An Commune 
was populated by local people (from the 
South of Vietnam), but the area was owned 
by large absentee owners, a remnant of 
the colonial era under French and later the 
Diem administration (Concession) and after 
1975 the area was divided and allocated 
to the different households working in the 
Concession.
At the same time, farmers in the area had 
access to High-yielding Variety (HYV) rice 
and started to cultivate 2 rice crops per 
years, but with variable success, due to high 
dependence on weather conditions and 
flood level. In the late ninety’s (1998-2001), 
an early flood protection was build by the 
government to improve water management. 
Together with this improvement, the value 
of the land increased and people from 
the North who were buying land from 
the Southern Vietnamese since the early 
nineties began to be considered as rich 
landowners by the Southerners. 
4.2 POLICY AND 
INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXTS
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES 
In each country, aquaculture plays an 
important role in regional and national 
economic development. Vietnam and 
Bangladesh have well-developed 
aquaculture sectors. Cambodia’s 
development plan now names aquaculture 
as a government priority. 
Rice culture and aquaculture 
intensification in Vietnam. Rice culture 
and aquaculture are the main drivers of 
the economy of the Mekong Delta. These 
primary sectors are moving toward more 
industrial scale, market orientation and 
specialization, and away from extensive 
production (Dong Thap, DoF director, 
personal communication.). 
In Vietnam, the reorientation of national 
policies on agriculture in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s brought dramatic change 
to agriculture and aquaculture. The 
Doi Moi policy encouraged farmers to 
intensify agriculture and aquaculture with 
the development of market economy. 
Regionally, the implementation of this 
policy can be seen with the intensification 
of rice production from single to double 
or triple cropping, denser drainage and 
irrigation systems, and flood protection 
infrastructure. For example, in Trung Phu 
B hamlet, triple-cropped rice ballooned 
from 5,600 ha in 2000 to 23, 878 ha in 
2005. Embankments that limit the onset 
and duration of flooding in rice fields also 
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limit the growth period for cultured fish. As 
high-input aquaculture is market oriented, 
it became a major sector of the regional 
economy.
AGRICULTURE AND AQUACULTURE 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE MEKONG DELTA 
OF VIETNAM 
Following decades of Marxist collectivization 
in Vietnam, the liberalization of economic 
policy under Doi Moi recognized the roles 
of free markets and smallholder family 
farms, thereby creating a new environment 
for developing Vietnamese agriculture 
and aquaculture. Change was allowed by 
a reorientation of agricultural policy and 
improved access to production inputs and 
equipment and postharvest facilities (Le 
Coq et al. 2004). Between 1990 and 2000, 
the Vietnamese government planned and 
constructed new dikes and embankments 
in the upper Mekong Delta to control 
flooding and increase rice productivity with 
two or three crops per year. In previously 
deeply flooded areas in An Giang Province, 
the area of floating rice decreased by 80% 
between 1975 and 1994 and the area of 
irrigated rice increased from 35,000 ha to 
175,000 ha. According to the provincial 
master plan, 40% of the land planted to rice 
would be triple cropped by 2010 (Kakonen 
2008). 
Another dynamic of rural development 
in the Mekong Delta was the expansion 
of aquaculture. In the past 2 decades, 
aquaculture development in freshwater 
areas of the Mekong Delta has been 
driven by international market demand of 
catfish (Pangasisus hypophthalmus and 
P. bocourti ). Catfish production in 2004 
was 315,000 tons (mainly in An Giang, 
Can Tho and Dong Thap provinces), or 
3.6 times that of 1999 and accounting 
for 56% of total freshwater aquaculture 
production in the Mekong Delta. The 
Ministry of Fisheries (MOFI 2005) estimated 
that catfish production would reach 1 
million tons in the Mekong Delta by 2010. 
The development of aquaculture was 
made possible by the expanded private 
sector, with 500 freshwater fish hatcheries 
producing 15 billion fish fry in 2004. The 
production of catfish fry leads, at 3 billion 
annually. The production of freshwater 
prawn and tilapia fry is also increasing, with 
35 million monosex tilapia fry produced in 
2002 and 180 million fingerlings in 2004. 
Carp and tilapia production is mainly for 
the domestic market. On the domestic 
market, aquaculture products generally 
fetch lower prices than wild catch.
Aquaculture plays an important role 
in Vietnam’s economic development. 
New regulations, policies and programs 
have created a favorable environment 
for expanding aquaculture in terms of 
seed production,8 access to credit9 and 
development programs.10 Governmental 
policies are complemented by provincial 
and local policies to encourage the 
development of aquaculture, which has 
created employment for more than 2 million 
people in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam and 
generated exports valued at more than 
$1.6 billion annually (MOFI 2006). Catfish 
farming contributes significantly to export 
revenues, generating $320 million in 2005 
(MOFI 2005). The Vietnamese government’s 
target for aquaculture exports was $2.5 
billion annually by 2010. Increased foreign 
exchange earnings from the sector are 
expected to be a major driver defining the 
development strategy. 
Vietnam has seven public organizations 
and departments involved in aquaculture 
development. Provincial and district DoF 
offices are responsible for extension 
services. The lowest administrative level 
with professional staff responsible for 
aquaculture is the district, as the DoF is 
not formally represented in communes, 
though policies are implemented through 
village extension agents. Growing demand 
for aquaculture inputs and services has 
encouraged the development of the 
private sector inputs in the Mekong Delta, 
8  Decision 103/2000/QD-TTg dated 25 August 2000 and Decision 112/2004/QD/TTg.
9  Decision 03/2000/NQ-CP dated 2 February 2000.
10  Decision 224/199/QD-TTg.
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including the more than 42 fish feed 
formulas available on the Vietnamese 
market. Knowledge is easily accessed in 
Vietnam through extension services, the 
private sector and broadcast media. 
AGRICULTURE AND AQUACULTURE 
DEVELOPMENT IN CAMBODIA
Compared with Vietnam, aquaculture 
in Cambodia is far less developed. 
Freshwater aquaculture supplied just 8.3% 
of Cambodian inland fishery production in 
2004, 72% of that amount from cage culture 
and 28% from pond culture (So et al. 2005). 
Pond culture is not traditional in Cambodia 
and, even if introduced to farmers through 
the FiA or nongovernmental organization 
projects, would be constrained by poor 
seed supply (So et al. 2000). Cambodian 
hatcheries supply only 18% of fish seed 
supplies, with wild capture supplying 26% 
and imports 56% (So and Haing 2007). 
Government-owned hatcheries supply 
61% of the fingerlings produced in the 
country, as small private hatcheries are 
not well developed and face technical and 
marketing constraints. An estimated 20 
million wild-caught fingerlings supplied 
cage culture in 2004, while imports from 
Vietnam, including illegal imports, were 
estimated at 60 million fingerlings for both 
cage and pond culture.
Farmers’ lack of investment in homestead 
pond construction, which costs $100-500 
per pond, and poor access to knowledge 
are two other main constraints on 
smallholder aquaculture development in 
Cambodia. Accessing technical knowledge 
and support is more difficult for Cambodian 
farmers than for their counterparts in 
Vietnam or Bangladesh, as less broadcast 
media reach remote areas to spread 
market information or share technical 
knowledge. The FiA cites the lack of human 
and financial resources in provincial FiA 
offices as constraining the development 
of aquaculture in Cambodia. In floodplain 
villages, extensive fish aquaculture uses 
mainly wild-caught seed, and production is 
mainly for home consumption. 
A statement of the government of 
Cambodia on national fishery sector 
policy (2005) stipulates that aquaculture at 
different scales has to be encouraged by 
implementing regional codes of conduct. 
The government wants to encourage 
the private sector in aquaculture to meet 
demand for fish. One of the six priorities 
of the Fisheries Development Action Plan, 
2005-2008 is to improve the livelihoods of 
poor rural people by increasing community 
and household production through 
aquaculture development. 
As in Vietnam, agriculture (specifically rice 
culture) shows the results of intensification, 
as the double-cropping of rice has become 
widespread with the development of 
irrigation systems. 
AGRICULTURE AND AQUACULTURE 
DEVELOPMENT IN BANGLADESH 
In Bangladesh, inland aquaculture showed 
spectacular growth at 10.5% per annum 
between 1986 and 2006. Freshwater 
pond aquaculture is the dominant fishery 
subsector in Bangladesh, contributing 
33% of total fish production and 85% of 
total aquaculture production in 2006. The 
government of Bangladesh has declared 
fisheries and aquaculture to be thrust 
sectors of the economy. Such national 
plans as Three-Year Rolling-Investment 
Program, 2003-2006 have promoted both 
capture fisheries and aquaculture, including 
rice-fish farming systems in floodplains. 
They have also addressed conservation 
and management issues and institutional 
and manpower training. The private sector 
is rapidly expanding in Bangladesh, with 
764 private freshwater fish and/or shrimp 
hatcheries producing more than 98% 
of the seed used in the country (DoF 
2007). According to a study by the Asian 
Development Bank (2005), fish markets 
are competitive, and farmers have a wide 
choice of seed suppliers. Dey et al. (2008) 
found fish feed markets to be competitive, 
with a good network of fish feed traders 
linking hatcheries and nurseries to fish 
farmers. Fourteen public organizations and 
departments are involved in managing and 
developing aquaculture in Bangladesh. 
The DoF is the main agency responsible 
for fishery extension services, with offices 
in districts and upazillas. 
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11 In his study, Pillot (2007) shows that the Mekong flow is within ±10% its 40-year average in only 3 years out of 5. The 
maximum height of the river can vary by 2 meters, which greatly affects the extent of flooding.
4.3 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT 
AND LANDSCAPE LEVEL 
FACTORS
AGRO-ECOLOGICAL CONDITIONS: 
VARIABILITY OF FLOODPLAINS
Table 1 presents the agro-ecologic 
conditions of project sites in each country. 
Sites in Bangladesh offer longer flood periods 
than do sites in Vietnam and Cambodia. 
A seasonally flooded depression, or beel, 
is used for fishing in the flood season 
and for a single crop of rice in the dry. In 
Bangladesh and Cambodia, agricultural 
land is locally classified in upland, medium 
upland and lowland according to flooding 
duration, which determines land use, 
with rainfed rice or vegetables on more 
elevated land and dry season rice on 
lowland. Villagers have access to other 
agricultural land during the rainy season to 
grow rainfed rice or vegetables. In Vietnam, 
by contrast, farmers growing double- or 
triple-cropped rice in most of the Mekong 
Delta have access only to inundated rice 
fields in the rainy season. A few orchards, 
tree plantations and sweet potato fields 
exist, but these crops cover very little area 
compared with rice. In the Plain of Reeds 
of the Mekong Delta, acid sulfate soils 
have been reclaimed for agriculture by 
leaching, but with the effect of acidifying 
the water of canals and rivers in May and 
June. The Plain of Reeds covers 10.6% 
of the Mekong Delta and is now used for 
double- and triple-cropped rice, but strong 
acidity persists at the beginning of the 
rainy season. The intensification of rice 
culture in Vietnam was made possible by 
government investment in flood-protection 
infrastructure in the upper Mekong Delta 
since the late 1980s. The embankment 
system can delay the flood to protect the 
second rice crop in June and July.
In Bangladesh, flood control infrastructure 
is less developed than in Vietnam, but 
water levels in depressions are managed 
using embankments and sluice gates. 
Embankments here do not shape the 
landscape as they do in the Mekong Delta; 
rather, natural land elevation protects crops 
from flooding. Cambodia’s floodplain is 
mainly an open system with no infrastructure 
to manage water. Some reservoirs allow 
water management with sluice gates to 
irrigate lowland rice in the dry season. 
Where it exists, reservoir management in 
Cambodia occurs on a larger scale than 
rice field water management in Vietnam, 
with several villages involved. 
DURATION AND AMPLITUDE OF 
FLOODING
The length of the flood in Vietnam and at 
some sites in Cambodia is shorter than 
it is in Bangladesh. In Vietnam, early 
flood protection to protect the mature 
second rice crop and the draining of rice 
fields in December limits the period of 
fish culture to August-December and, in 
triple-cropped rice areas, September-
December. As in Cambodia, inter-annual 
variation of the flood renders the start and 
amplitude of the flood unpredictable.11  At 
two sites in 2008, the flood was delayed 
until after August, and fingerling stocking 
was cancelled. A shortened flood period 
necessitates the use of larger fingerlings to 
reach market size and reduces the potential 
of advantageous sequential harvest as 
practiced in Bangladesh. 
Delayed flooding and low amplitude 
impeded fish stocking at Thnal Kaeng 
and Pom Eith in Cambodia in 2008, as 
the flood was delayed until September 
and the water was too low to allow fish 
culture. In 2007, Bangladesh experienced 
abnormal flooding. At Beel Mail, a flood 
height of 5 meters was recorded in 2007 
and 3.5 meters in 2008. At Angrar and 
Kalmina beels, the lack of flood control was 
highlighted as a main technical constraint 
on fish culture. 
At Trung Phu B hamlet in Vietnam, 24% of 
beneficiaries considered the flood too low 
in 2007 for fish culture, as the maximum 
water depth of 60 centimeters in September 
meant high water temperatures and a lack 
of nutrients for fish culture. In the same 
month, the depth was 106 centimeters at 
C2 hamlet and 102 centimeters at D1. In 
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2009, late and low flooding at D1 slowed 
fish growth. With rice culture intensification 
and a shortened flood period, stocking 
is 1-2 months later in Vietnam than in 
Bangladesh and the harvest is earlier, 
finishing in early December, as compared 
with January in Bangladesh. These 
differences in the growth period can partly 
explain differences in productivity. 
PRESENCE OF FLOOD-MANAGEMENT 
INFRASTRUCTURE
The presence of flood management 
infrastructure may be essential to control 
unpredictable flooding events and the 
associated damage to the fish culture 
system. Flood management infrastructure 
and fencing are strongly linked technical 
requirements. In Vietnam, the regional 
early flood-protection system provides a 
favorable environment for fish culture, with 
large areas delimited by embankments. 
Sites were selected in Vietnam on the basis 
of the presence of dikes to protect against 
flooding. Community development of an 
irrigation scheme provides tools with which 
to manage water for flood protection and 
drainage, facilitating the harvest. However, 
some losses were incurred in C2 and Hung 
Binh hamlets as the dike was too low, and fish 
escaped after a heavy rain. Flashflooding 
was the main technical constraint on CBFC 
cited by 53% of respondents at C2 and all 
respondents at Hung Binh.
The water bodies into which fish culture 
was introduced in Bangladesh are local 
depressions surrounded by rice fields, with 
dikes that allow some water management, 
facilitated by sluice gates at Beel Mail and 
Angrar Beel. However, at Kalmina Beel, 
some improvement in water management 
was necessary to lengthen the fish culture 
period. The local population welcomed the 
construction of a sluice gate because it 
benefits not only fish culture but also rice 
cultivation by protecting against flashfloods 
and allowing irrigation during droughts.
In Cambodia, which lacks a flood control 
system, and there are no mechanisms 
for local management of broad flood 
conditions, fish culture groups suffered 
losses of stocked fish as a result of high and 
unpredictable flooding events. In Pom Eith 
village, the enclosure fence failed to hold 
fish after heavy rain caused a sudden rise 
in the water level at Pom Eith village. The 
effects of downstream infrastructure can 
exacerbate flood problems in Cambodia. In 
Takeo Province in southern Cambodia, the 
sluice gates at the Cambodian-Vietnamese 
border built to protect Vietnamese rice 
cause higher flooding in the upstream part 
of the floodplain and constrain fish culture 
during this period, according to villagers, 
necessitating a higher dike or fencing to 
protect the cultured area.
WATER CHEMISTRY
Water acidity in the Plain of Reeds of 
Vietnam limits fish culture to the flood 
period. The local DoF officer in Thap 
Moi District characterizes Truong Xuan 
hamlet as having only limited potential 
for year-round aquaculture, as half of it is 
severely affected by acidity, thus limiting 
fish culture to the flood season. This may 
favour community-based fish culture, as 
acidity could preclude the development of 
commercial, year-round pond aquaculture. 
4.4 SOCIO-CULTURAL 
CONTEXT
PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE OF 
COLLECTIVE ACTION AND COMMUNITY-
BASED MANAGEMENT 
The presence of existing community-based 
institutions and evidence of collective 
action has been put forward as a pre-
condition for successful collective action. 
Site selection in Vietnam was partly based 
on the willingness of farmers to join the 
group and on the presence of an existing 
collective for rice farming or fish culture. In 
C2 and Trung Phu B hamlets, farmers were 
grouped by irrigation unit to share drainage 
and irrigation costs. Collective fish culture 
had been successfully developed in 
2005 in D1 hamlet and in 2006 in Trung 
Phu B with the support of provincial and 
district authorities. In Trung Phu B, a 
rice cooperative was established from 
1978 to 1988. After the Doi Moi reform, 
the cooperative disappeared and only in 
2004, with the ASPS project a new form 
of collective action was developed, with 
the creation of a “Rice Group”. This group 
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was formed to coordinate the activity of 
rice culture (mainly for Integrated Pest 
Management) and to develop also collective 
aquaculture. This project was implemented 
by the Department of Agriculture and Rural 
Development (DARD) of Can Tho city and 
the main activities were to provide technical 
support and training. This group was the 
basis for the development of fish culture 
in 2005. However, this “Rice Group” is not 
recognized as a formal group by many 
farmers, and most of them do not know 
the project ASPS. For them the group is 
not formal and consists of meetings for rice 
culture coordination and for water and pest 
management. 
In Vietnam, a number of official groups 
exist in every commune, with branches at 
the hamlet level level, including a Farmer 
Organisation, Womens Organisation, 
Youth and Veteran Unions and a Health 
Care Organisation (Werthmann and Mai 
Thi Truc 2008). Even if CBFC was not 
successful, project implementation was 
facilitated by the presence of these groups, 
as in Kalmina Beel in Bangladesh, with 
collective action for school construction 
or rotational microcredit and integrated 
rice pest management in Pom Eith village 
in Cambodia. In Cambodia, a Khmer NGO 
Chamroe Chiet Khmer Organisation (CCK) 
supported the formation of three self-
help groups in Pom Eith village, including 
a group to prevent the outbreak of brown 
plant hopper, a savings group and a bicycle 
group. In Thnal Kaeng, the international 
NGO CARE has encouraged community 
activities in the village, including the 
establishment of rice and credit banks, 
as well as the Farmer Water User Group 
(FWUG) (Werthmann and Mai Thi Truc 
2008). 
However, the extent to which the presence 
of these organizations influenced the 
outcome of community-based fish culture 
activities is unclear. The nature of the 
interaction amongst members of the fish 
culture group differs considerably from 
the requirements of participation in the 
official groups in Vietnam, or the NGO 
created groups in Cambodia. The benefits 
from collective action in the institutions 
described are qualitatively different from 
the potential benefits from fish culture, 
and also do not carry a financial risk if the 
activity fails. As Gillinson (2004) reports, 
solidarity benefits and social gratification 
are important incentives for collective 
action, as studies by Schlozman (1995) 
and Walker and King (1992) have showed, 
albeit in the United States. In the case of 
pest management, and the control of the 
brown hopper, cooperation is essential 
for effective control against outbreaks. As 
a contributing factor in the continuance 
of community-based fish culture, the 
primary advantage that can be gained 
from community participation in existing 
organizations, is the creation of greater 
social cohesion, mutual understanding and 
trust amongst members. 
SOCIAL COHESION AND COOPERATION 
BETWEEN DIFFERENT STAKEHOLDERS
Cooperation and social cohesion is a 
necessary community attribute if CBFC is 
to succeed. Lack of social cohesion was 
apparent in some cases as communication 
problems and in others to the desire to 
work individually. 
In Bangladesh, developing the project 
with an established local institution such 
as the fishers’ society at Beel Mail or with 
the involvement of religious authorities as 
at Kalmina Beel helped to build cohesive 
community action. Moreover, cooperation 
between fishers and landowners in 
Beel Mail was facilitated by cooperation 
previously exercised during 7 years of 
holding the lease on the water body. In 
Vietnam, the process was constrained by 
weak social structures such as the hamlet 
farmers’ association, which was considered 
weak at Trung Phu B, or the rice group at 
C2 hamlet, which most farmers did not 
recognize. At D1 hamlet the group had only 
11 households in 2009, 9 of which were 
closely related. According to the members 
of this small group, “they will know how 
to keep their money” and in 2007 it was 
public fish and in 2009 it is their “own fish.” 
In 2009, the project site enjoyed efficient 
guarding and technical implementation, 
with no poaching. In addition, members did 
not receive any payment for guarding and 
harvesting tasks, as in previous years. 
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Group size was often cited as a challenge 
to effective group management. In Vietnam, 
16% of respondents at D1 hamlet and 20% 
at C2 found it difficult to manage a group of 
farmers, expressed as “too many people, too 
many ideas.” At Trung Phu B hamlet, 18% of 
respondents thought that collective action 
was possible only for rice culture because 
rice belongs to individuals at harvest time, 
unlike production from CBFC. At this 
hamlet, more than 50% of respondents 
voiced their concern about managing 
a large group, as at D1 and C2 hamlets. 
In addition, the community neighboring 
D1 hamlet, which was considered 
poorer because of its high percentage of 
landless households, complained about 
the lack of access to their usual fishing 
grounds. Tensions between the two 
communities were reported during project 
implementation. In 2009, landowners near 
the poorer community declined to join 
because of reports of poaching by villagers 
in the neighbouring hamlet. 
In Cambodia, sharing information, 
specifically during the project startup, was 
a constraint at Pom Eith, where 30% of 
respondents indicated poor communication 
from the village leader, and at Potamon, 
where 10% voiced that complaint. At this 
last village, 52% of respondents highlighted 
the lack of cooperation among villagers, 
which was often linked to frequent and 
unpredictable migration to Phnom Penh 
for wage labor, creating an unfavorable 
environment for collective action. 
Often, working together on a collective 
basis caused stress and conflict within the 
participating communities, as reported at 3 
sites in Vietnam and 1 site in Cambodia. At 
D1 hamlet in Vietnam, three beneficiaries 
explained that fish culture caused more 
stress than any other livelihood activity, 
with night watch, fear of poaching and 
suspicion among neighbors. These 
beneficiaries explained that they preferred 
not to report poaching by other project 
participants to maintain good relations with 
their neighbors. The project is a source of 
tension among beneficiaries, according to 
5% of respondents at D1, 12% at Trung Phu 
B and 15% at Hung Binh. Similar effects on 
relations were found at Potamon village in 
Cambodia, according to one villager there. 
Excluding resource users from a common 
resource inevitably leads to some tension, 
as was found in Vietnam and Cambodia. 
However, mechanisms can be put in place 
to reduce the impact on non-beneficiaries, 
and to increase their acceptance of the fish 
culture intervention. The acceptance of the 
project by non-beneficiaries depends on 
the benefits they receive. At the successful 
sites of Kalmina Beel and Beel Mail in 
Bangladesh, non-beneficiaries could buy 
fish more cheaply than at the local market. 
At Kalmina Beel, the price of silver carp 
dropped from $1.02-1.17/kg at the local 
market to $0.51-0.58/kg in the village. A 
similar impact was described at D1, C2 and 
Trung Phu B hamlets in Vietnam but to a 
lesser extent, as the benefit of lower fish 
prices was reported for only a short period 
of 15-20 days during the fish harvest and 
applied only to neighboring households, 
not to the entire village, as in Bangladesh. 
In Vietnam, greater cooperation with other 
users of the area such as fishers would 
reduce the likelihood of conflict between 
resource users. At Hung Binh and Truong 
Xuan hamlets, cooperation with fishers was 
enabled by access to other fishing grounds 
and information sharing with the support of 
local authorities.
Integration with other land uses in Vietnam 
requires coordination with the rice cropping 
calendar, as rice culture is the farmers’ 
priority. In some cases, when the irrigation 
scheme is collective, coordinating the 
rice cropping calendar is necessary on a 
scale larger than that of the fish culture 
site, as at Hung Binh and Truong Xuan 
hamlets. Coordinating the drainage and 
irrigation calendar of the area therefore 
requires the cooperation of a larger group 
and, in the case of Truong Xuan hamlet, 
the cooperation of commune and district 
authorities. Integration with rice culture 
can require technical adjustments such as 
using pesticides for rice that will not harm 
fish. Shortening the fish grow-out period to 
accommodate a third rice crop may require 
buying or nursing larger fingerlings so that 
fish reach marketable size.
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4.5 LIVELIHOOD CONTEXT 
FLOODING, FARMING SYSTEMS AND 
HOUSEHOLDS ACTIVITIES
Specific agro-ecological conditions at each 
site reflect different farming systems, access 
rights or water-management systems, which 
influence the technical implementation of 
projects and incentives for beneficiaries 
to develop CBFC. Farming systems are 
closely linked to flood period and water 
management systems. 
Bangladesh. In Bangladesh, the flood 
period is long, stretching from July to 
December, with highest water at between 3 
and 5 meters deep in the beel, while higher 
land, either less inundated or not at all, 
supports rainy season rice (Figure 4). The 
main rice crop is grown in the beel during 
the dry season, while the rice crop grown 
on elevated land during the rainy season 
is economically less important (Table 8). 
Landowners usually have access to another 
agro-ecosystem, enabling different kinds 
of production during the year. Vegetable 
Figure 4: seasonal calendar in project sites in Cambodia, Vietnam and Banlgadesh
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and potato cultivated on areas not affected 
by the flood are economically important 
for landowners, as is fish culture. In some 
beels, landowners own and operate small 
trap ponds at the end of the flood season, 
subsequently using the water for irrigation. 
The main fishing season is during the 
flood, from September to December. At 
this time, fishers are fully employed, unlike 
during the dry season, when fishing is less 
important and fishers and landless farmers 
work as paid laborers in others’ rice fields. 
The landless are employed as agricultural 
labor or involved in fishing or other off-farm 
activity during the flood season. For both 
fishers and the landless, the most food 
insecure period is the end of the dry season 
and beginning of the flood season, when 
employment is scarce and fish availability 
is low. 
Combodia. Flooding can start earlier 
in Cambodia than in Vietnam, as the 
latter has infrastructure for early flood 
protection. Downstream water management 
infrastructure in Vietnam affects Cambodian 
provinces such as Takeo (Kakonen 2008). 
Sluice gates at the Cambodian-Vietnamese 
border are operated to protect rice fields in 
An Giang and Ken Giang provinces from 
flooding, which is delayed until September 
in Ken Giang. This causes higher flood 
damage in the floodplain in Cambodia 
(Hoa et al. 2007). Open rice fields can 
be flooded from early June or July until 
January in the lowest areas. However, 
at project sites the duration of flooding 
was shorter in two cases, from August to 
November or December, with fish culture in 
rice fields during the flood and until January 
in reservoirs.
Rice culture is less intense in Cambodia 
than in Vietnam or Bangladesh. Farmers 
harvest only one crop of deepwater rice 
and rarely a second rice crop for lack of 
irrigation. As few farmers can cultivate 
rice in the dry season, opportunities for 
hired rice labor are limited. Young family 
members and some household heads 
migrate to cities, other provinces or even to 
Thailand to work as wage labor in factories, 
agriculture or construction. Low rice yields 
and the absence of off-farm activities 
strongly limit livelihood strategies, with 
farmers depending on rice field fisheries 
and seasonal migration to meet households 
needs.
Vietnam. The flood period in Vietnam is 
short compared with that of Bangladesh. 
Rice fields are intensively used, with well-
develop irrigation and flood-protection 
systems allowing two or three rice crops 
per year. Vietnamese farmers in the Mekong 
Delta typically have access to only one type 
of agro-ecological area. Off-farm activities 
are important for smallholder farmers, but 
there is little migration like that observed in 
Cambodia. During the short flood season, 
rice fields are used mainly as open-access 
fishing grounds or to rear ducks. A few are 
table 8: Agricultural production cost and return at project sites
yield Variable Cost ($/ha) net return ($/ha)
Dry season rice
  Vietnam (n = 28) 6.6-7.9 487-748 860-1612
  Bangladesh (n = 3)a 3.0-3.6 726-772 331-363
  Cambodia (n = 9) > 3 nd nd
Rainy season/2nd rice crop
  Vietnam (n = 29) 3.0-5.1 516-757 (44b) 391-612
  Bangladesh (n = 3)a 2.0-2.5 363-445 70-152
  Cambodia (n = 36) 0.5-2.325 150-302 75-525c
3rd rice crop 
  Vietnam (n = 9) 4.0-4.1 677-694 172-292
Upland crop (Bangladesh)
  Fish culture (n = 86e) nd nd 1,845/HH
  Potato (n = 2) nd 1,000-1,300 1,625-4,537d
ha = hectare, HH = household, n = number, nd = no data available. 
a Data collected during group discussion.
b Result in Plains of Reeds, which is low because of low yield and low rice price in 2008.
c In Cambodia most of the rice production is for home consumption.
d Selling price of potato varies by 100% during the year. 
e Results from a baseline survey of 86 households at Kalmina Beel.
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used for lotus culture. In late November or 
early December, rice fields are drained to 
start rice culture, thus limiting the duration 
of the flood. The flood season is considered 
the least-active season, as farmers fish for 
their own consumption. Usually farmers 
and the landless also pursue such off-farm 
activities as construction but may migrate 
to work as hired labor in rice fields in other 
provinces of the delta.
AVAILABILITY OF ALTERNATIVE 
LIVELIHOOD OPTIONS
The employment opportunities provided 
by fish culture may provide a strong 
incentive for participation and cooperation, 
particularly where alternative occupations 
are limited or absent. Employment as 
guards or workers building the bamboo 
fence is an incentive for poor fishers and 
the landless to participate. At Beel Mail, the 
monthly salary for a guard is $29.40 /month 
and for fencing labor $2.20/day, which 
is the daily rate for labor in the region. At 
Kalmina Beel, the landless hired to work in 
rice fields benefit from higher rice yields, 
which creates more jobs. At D1 hamlet, 
employment as a guard or harvester 
was a clear incentive, paying $1.17/night 
in 2007 and similar rate for harvesting. 
Beneficiaries working as both night guards 
and harvesters could earn more than $117 
during the fish culture period. Competition 
for work as night guard and harvester later 
created conflict in the group.
In Bangladesh, harvesting, night watch 
and other duties are undertaken by the 
landless and fishers, not by landowners as 
in Vietnam. The daily rate in Bangladesh 
for harvesting is $5.88/day, which is more 
than 2.5 times the labor rate in agriculture 
of $1.70-2.20/day. In Vietnam, daily rates in 
agriculture or construction are $2.00-4.60, 
which is more attractive than harvesting 
fish for about $1.10/day. At several sites in 
Vietnam, harvesting by members of the fish 
culture group was mandatory and unpaid. 
However, in locations where alternative 
occupations exist, and generate greater 
or more stable benefits than fish culture, 
community-based fish culture is less likely 
to be adopted due to the high costs of 
cooperation and demand for labour for 
guarding and harvesting the fish stock. 
Economic benefit is key to individual 
decisions to continue CBFC. In Cambodia 
and Vietnam, the economic results were 
negative (Table 6), prompting 68% of 
beneficiaries at D1 hamlet, 78% at C2, 76% 
at Trung Phu B and 44% at Truong Xuan 
to quit the project. At Choy Proan village 
in Cambodia, 40% of participants stopped 
CBFC due to lack of income. 
Even if seasonal migration in Cambodia 
or other employment during the entire 
flood period did not occur, villagers and 
specifically poor farmers preferred not to 
be bound to a project with daily or weekly 
duties, but rather be available for off-farm 
activities that can provide daily income. 
For example, four participants at Truong 
Xuan hamlet left the project for off-farm 
employment. Another declined to join in 
favor of being hired by a forest enterprise 
with a daily wage. In addition, the project 
was perceived as a new technique with 
no guarantee of benefits at the end of the 
flood season, and thus not really appealing 
to villagers. Off-farm activities and fishing 
are subsistence activities during the flood 
season, while income from fish culture is 
earned only after fish harvest in December 
or January, if at all. During a meeting of 
the fish culture group at Truong Xuan 
hamlet, the wives of some small landowner 
participants interrupted the meeting to 
complain about the lack of income due to 
their husbands’ involvement in the project 
instead of fishing or being hired as wage 
labor. 
In Bangladesh, involvement in other 
activities affected only the attendance of 
landowners at meetings at Angrar Beel. 
Participation in the project did not interfere 
with other activities, perhaps thanks to 
the involvement of professional fishers 
during the harvest and the employment of 
the landless for the night watch. Various 
stakeholders pointed out that other wage 
labor is not regularly available at this time 
of year.
Land use, cropping and livelihood activities 
vary slightly between sites in the Mekong 
Delta. In D1, C2 and Truong Xuan the 
main land use is two rice crops per year 
with a Dong Xuan crop (end of November/
December to February/March) followed by 
He Tu crop (end of March to June). In Trung 
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Phu B and Hung Bin farmers follow a triple 
rice crop calendar, with the third crop from 
June to the end of August/September. In 
the latter site, other crops such as sweet 
potato and watermelon are also popular 
and are important source of income.
The livelihood activities are related to two 
mains seasons: dry and flood season. 
During the flood season (from July/August 
up to November) in D1, the main activities 
are fishing for home consumption and off-
farm activities. Between the rice harvest 
and the beginning of the flood, rice plots 
are rented out for duck rearing, which is an 
important source of income with a renting 
fee of 0.5 Mvnd/ha for one month in 2008. 
Similar activities are found in C2. Within the 
group participating in fish culture, which 
represented 77% of the community, 36% 
of the households have an off-farm activity 
during the flood season (construction 
building, digging land or carrying rice) and 
21% of the households receive remittances 
from their relatives (son or daughter) who 
migrated to cities (Ho Chi Minh City or Can 
Tho). Forty percent of the respondents are 
fishing during the flood season for home 
consumption and 13% more intensively 
(trap net and longer gill net) for additional 
income.
In Trung Phu B, fishing activity and 
hired labor are the main activity of 
the households, even if hired labor 
opportunities are limited in this commune. 
Digging land or land transportation does 
not provide enough employment in the 
hamlet, most households rely on their own 
labor force. Rice carrying is the main hired 
labor activity in the area, but only a few 
farmers are involved. For most households 
and specifically the landless, poor and 
even medium income households, the 
main income comes from fishing activity 
and collecting snails (300 vnd/kg). Rat, frog 
and snake hunting also provide additional 
income for poor households.
In this hamlet, a distinction can be made 
between poor and medium households, 
with a difference in fishing equipment. 
Poor households usually fish in rice fields 
because they cannot afford to buy a river 
gill net (170,000 vnd/net) and they do not 
own a boat, whereas fishing in rice field 
requires a smaller minimum investment 
(50,000 vnd/net). The daily income varies 
between 30,000 to 40,000 vnd on average. 
The flood season is the most difficult 
period at all sites, with fewer wage labour 
opportunities available. The season 
between rice crops during the dry season 
is also a difficult time. 
In C2 hamlet, the end of the flood season 
(October) and January /February is 
considered the most difficult period for poor 
households with are fewer opportunities to 
work, no income and school fees to pay (1 
Mvnd for 10 years old pupil).  Households 
have to borrow money or buy goods on 
credit. In this period, fishing is important 
to provide daily food for many poor 
households. 
In Trung Phu B , the most difficult periods 
for most poor households are in the 
flood season, and between the two rice 
harvests (2 months) when there is little 
work available. Frequently, they borrow 
money to buy the family needs during this 
period or to finance their rice crop from 
the farmers who usually hire them, with a 
monthly interest rate of 10 to 20%.
In Hung Binh hamlet, hired labor in the dry 
season is an important source of income 
for poor and medium households. The 
peak activity period is during February 
and March during DX harvest and HT land 
preparation and later between June and 
July for the second peak period for wage 
labor. The main activities are harvesting 
rice (40 to 80,000 vnd/day) and carrying 
rice (40 - 50,000 vnd/day). During these 
periods a person can be hired 15 to 20 
days in a month. Sweet potato also requires 
hired labor during harvest, but to a lesser 
extend than rice culture.
AVAILABILITY OF LABOUR
Labour is important to the success of fish 
culture, as protecting and harvesting the fish 
stock is labour intensive. Lack of labour for 
fish culture due to seasonal out-migration 
was reported as an issue at 4 of the 12 
sites included in the study. In Cambodia 
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more than in Vietnam, participation in the 
project was limited by seasonal migration. 
Men and, to a lesser extent, women migrate 
to Phnom Penh or Thailand to work in 
construction, in factories or on large farms 
when there are no rice-farming activities 
in the village (Figure 4). The percentage 
of households with at least one member, 
usually the head of household, migrating 
during the flood was 77% in Thnal Kaeng 
(n = 18), 76% in Pom Eith (20), 70% in 
Potamon (19) and 20% in Chroy Poan (20). 
Villagers preferred to migrate even briefly to 
ensure a monthly income for the household 
instead of joining a group for fish culture, 
thus limiting the number of participants in 
the project. Seasonal migrations are less 
pronounced in Vietnam, with only 10% of 
interviewed households in D1 hamlet, 11% in 
C2 and 26% in Trung Phu B with a member, 
usually a young member, migrating for 
economic reasons. This phenomenon was 
not observed in Bangladesh, as farmers 
were occupied in rice fields that were not 
inundated during the rainy season. 
In Vietnam, as in Cambodia, the availability 
of labor for guarding cultured fish was 
a constraint at sites where sharing this 
responsibility was mandatory. Some fish 
culture groups chose to pay hired labour 
to guard the fish, increasing the cost of 
fish production. At Hung Binh hamlet, 
where only five households participated 
in fish culture, labour shortage was a 
problem. At Truong Xuan hamlet, 33% 
of the respondents found the work too 
onerous, as 90 ha was managed by only 13 
participants. The following year, 2009, saw 
seven participants managing 120 ha and 
hiring workers during the harvest. Among 
non-beneficiaries interviewed at Pom Eith 
in Cambodia, 45% said they preferred not 
to join the project because of the heavy 
duties involved in the night watch and food 
collection. 
Labour problems were compounded by 
the constraints on some members of the 
group to participate in the night watch and 
harvesting activities, from which women 
and older participants were excluded. At 
Thnal Kaeng in Cambodia, four interviewed 
women explained that they did not 
participate because they could not fulfill 
night watch duties. In Truong Xuan and 
Hung Binh, two farmers decided to quit 
the group because they were too old for 
project activities.
LAND AVAILABILITY AND DEPENDENCE 
ON FISHING AND FISH CULTURE
In Bangladesh, farmers have access to 
land at different elevations, allowing them 
to cultivate rice during the rainy season. In 
the Mekong Delta in Vietnam, by contrast, 
farmers do not have access to lands 
unaffected by floods and cannot cultivate 
during this period. This allows farmers to 
dedicate some of their time to monitoring 
fish culture, having secured a part of 
their income from rice, upland crops like 
vegetables and potatoes, or individual 
fish culture. In Vietnam, fish culture is the 
only activity on farmers’ land during the 
flood, so Vietnamese farmers are involved 
in more CBFC activities such as guarding 
and harvesting than are landowners 
in Bangladesh. This is why the risk for 
Vietnamese farmers is higher. 
4.6 INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
SUPPORTIVE LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
The support of local authorities was found 
to be a critical factor in the successful 
development of community-based fish 
culture.  Local authorities were instrumental 
in preventing illegal fishing and poaching, 
supporting the maintenance of critical 
infrastructure, including water management 
infrastructure and promoting transparent 
management mechanisms in a co-
management arrangement. 
Local authorities play an important role 
in preventing illegal fishing and poaching 
at project sites. At two sites in Vietnam 
where poaching was high, D1 and C2 
hamlets, as well as at Thnal Kaeng village 
in Cambodia where the project faces 
vandalism problems, beneficiaries saw 
lack of support from local authorities as a 
constraint; 5% of respondents in D1 and 
13% of respondents in C2 cited this lack 
of support, as did four project participants, 
or 80% of the beneficiaries, in Thnal Kaeng 
village. At Kalmina Beel in Bangladesh, 
local authorities’ support in preventing 
vandalism of the fence was an important 
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factor contributing to success, according 
to project beneficiaries. 
In Cambodia, access to knowledge and 
support from extension services or the 
private sector is limited. In Chroy Poan 
village, for example, uptake and adoption of 
aquaculture on an individual basis spread 
only after frequent visits of FiA staff during 
the project. 
In Bangladesh, district and upazilla officers 
were involved directly in the project, making 
several visits to the site and participating in 
the PIC. In addition, FMC meetings were 
held in the presence of the senior upazilla 
DoF officer. Upazilla and district officers 
received some payment from the project 
for their involvement. In the case of public 
land, support from the administration is 
needed to acquire the lease, and on private 
land the support of local authorities is 
needed as a guarantee against vandalism 
and poaching. The DoF also supports 
CBFC through fingerling release programs. 
Project beneficiaries report that technical, 
economic and management supervision 
by an external advisor such the DoF or 
WorldFish is needed. In Beel Mail, members 
of the FMC acknowledge as an enabling 
factor the proper planning of tasks done in 
collaboration with project partners. Project 
beneficiaries contrast this approach with 
their less-successful first attempt at CBFC 
in 2005, when there was no scheduled 
planning or monitoring of activities. 
In Truong Xuan hamlet in Vietnam and 
Chroy Poan village in Cambodia, project 
implementation prompted more frequent 
visits from local authorities and technicians 
in the DoF and FiA to these remote areas, 
bringing new access to knowledge and 
inputs and creating a favorable environment 
for aquaculture development.
However, land tenure is a sensitive issue 
and source of conflict in Bangladesh. The 
involvement of government agencies in a 
privately owned area can create suspicion 
among landlords of land tenure change. 
This suspicion limits the participation of 
landowners in the project, as happened in 
Kalmina Beel during the early stages of the 
project.  
The influence of DoF officers and local 
authorities in project management is a 
greater constraint in the case of private 
land, as at Kalmina and Angrar beels, than 
of public land such as Beel Mail, where the 
the DoF has the legal authority to manage 
resources. Beneficiaries’ perception of 
DoF staff was also important. At Kalmina 
Beel, corruption amongst government 
officials was feared and transparent 
roles and behavior were required to gain 
beneficiaries’ trust. 
Technical support from WorldFish and/or 
local project partners was highlighted as 
important at the three sites in Bangladesh 
and at the villages of Chroy Poan and 
Pom Eith in Cambodia. For 30% of the 
beneficiaries at Pom Eith and 40% at Chroy 
Poan, the incentive to join the project was 
to gain access to aquaculture knowledge. 
GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS FOR 
COMMUNITY-BASED MANAGEMENT
Beneficiaries in Bangladesh cited 
the development of transparency in 
accounting as the most important factor 
enabling CBFC, along with project 
support. PICs closely monitored FMCs, 
specifically regarding budget issues. 
Joint bank accounts and the presence of 
stakeholder groups’ representatives during 
monetary transactions built trust among 
stakeholders.
Change in FMC organization at Angrar 
Beel in 2009 after the failure of the project 
the previous year is symptomatic of the 
importance of FMC organization. In 2009, 
the FMC was reformed with new members 
to prevent power lying with one individual, 
the group leader, subcommittees were 
created for such tasks as harvesting, 
marketing, fencing and guarding. Accounts 
were made more transparent to regain the 
trust and confidence of members. More 
active members were selected to join the 
FMC to prevent a small group of individuals 
monopolizing decision-making and to 
promote more democratic processes.
At Beel Mail and Kalmina Beel, the FMC is 
composed of trusted and respected people 
representing each stakeholder group, 
which has facilitated cooperation among 
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landowners, fishers and the landless. At 
these sites, transparent accountancy, 
joint bank accounts together with the DoF 
officer, and the presence of WorldFish staff 
during fingerling stocking improved mutual 
trust among beneficiaries. At Kalmina beel, 
local religious authorities are present during 
FMC meetings and create an environment 
of trust.  
The experience of successful sites in 
Bangladesh suggests that management 
committees need to be composed of 
proactive representatives of stakeholder 
groups such as landowners, fishers 
and the landless, as well as previous 
resources users. For a large group, the 
committee is divided into subcommittees 
that are allocated specific tasks. Each 
subcommittee is similarly representative 
of stakeholder groups to promote 
transparency. The effective sharing of 
information is another key to developing 
community-based action at sites with 
multiple communities. At Angrar Beel, which 
has five villages involved in the project, 
beneficiaries highlighted the importance of 
conducting meetings to share information 
and ensuring that different beneficiary 
groups are informed of the meetings. 
LAND OWNERSHIP 
The average cultivated area at project 
sites belonging to individual households 
in Vietnam varies from 1.1 ha to 2.8 ha 
(n = 100) and, in Cambodia, from 1.2 to 
2.0 in Cambodia (n = 61). In Bangladesh, 
land tenure was difficult to estimate, but 
landholding varies from 0.1 ha to more 
than 5 ha in the different sites, with 
medium-scale and large landowners 
having access to land in different agro-
ecological zones. Unlike at Vietnamese 
or even Cambodian project sites, large 
landowners in Bangladesh represent 14-
29% of households cultivating more than 
0.4 ha, while poor households who are 
either landless or cultivate less than 0.2 ha 
represent 34-49% of households.12
The size of individual land holdings within 
the fish culture area had implications for 
benefit sharing, which occasionally led to 
disagreements amongst participants. In 
D1 hamlet in 2006 and 2007, as well as 
in C2 and Trung Phu B hamlets, benefits 
were shared according to landholding, as 
in Bangladesh. However, two landowners 
with less than 1 ha in C2 hamlet preferred 
not to participate in the project because 
their potential benefit was too small, 
considering the time investment. In 
Bangladesh, small landowners joined the 
project, perhaps because of the absence 
of any constraining duties such as the night 
watch or harvesting.
4.7 THE FLOODPLAIN AS A 
MULTIPLE USE SYSTEM 
COMPETITION FOR SPACE
At the household and individual level, 
flooded rice fields in Vietnam are fishing 
grounds and areas suitable for duck 
farming. Renting out rice fields early in the 
flood season for duck rearing is a common 
source of income for rice farmers in the 
Mekong Delta. In D1, C2 and Trung Phu B 
hamlets, income from land renting varies 
by year from $5.80-28.00 per month per 
hectare. As fish culture and duck rearing 
are not compatible, farmers have to decide 
between renting land out for duck rearing or 
stocking fish, usually basing their decision 
on the comparative potential for profit.
At D1 hamlet, 46% of respondents stated 
that the lack of access to fishing grounds 
greatly affected them, as 77% of the 
households in the area used to fish during 
the flood season. At Trung Phu B, 30% 
of the respondents were affected by the 
change in access rights. However, at Trung 
Phu B, access restriction did not lead to 
frequent poaching, as at D1. 
In Cambodia, competition for resources 
was found in two places, regarding 
access for fishing and watering cattle at 
Thnal Kaeng village and regarding duck 
farming and rice irrigation at Chroy Poan. 
In both sites, no agreement was found, 
and competition for resources ended in 
poaching and vandalism. 
In Vietnam, fish culture takes place in the 
only agro-ecosystem of an area, in which 
farmers cultivate two or three rice crops, 
12 Results based on participatory rapid appraisals of villages at project sites at an early stage of the project. 
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rear ducks early in flood season, and fish 
(Figure 4). This succession of activities 
in the same land area requires timing 
adjustments, and the addition of fish culture 
may create conflict with other users. Some 
examples found at Vietnamese project sites 
are described below:
•	 In	Trung	Phu	B	and	Hung	Binh	hamlets,	
farmers planted three rice crops per 
year, which delayed fish stocking and 
necessitated early drainage of water, 
limiting the fish grow-out period. 
•	 Even	in	areas	with	only	two	rice	crops,	
such as D1, C2 and Truong Xuan hamlets, 
fish culture was affected by early land 
preparation at the end of fish culture. 
Plowing increased water turbidity to the 
detriment of the environment for fish, 
and farmers’ allocation of time to rice 
culture created a labor shortage during 
fish harvesting at C2. Farmers at these 
project sites — even those involved in 
fish culture — prioritize securing their 
rice crop with early land preparation 
and sowing. Similar constraints affected 
areas with three rice crops, such as 
Trung Phu B. 
•	 In	Truong	Xuan	hamlet,	 the	project	site	
is part of a larger water management or 
hydraulic unit, with a pumping station 
draining the water to irrigate a few 
hundred hectares of rice fields. Fish 
culture in rice fields has to follow the 
water management calendar decided 
by district and commune authorities. In 
2008, early drainage shortened the fish 
grow-out period and forced farmers to 
harvest fish prematurely. 
•	 Pesticide	residues	from	rice	culture	may	
affect fish growth, according to RIA2 
staff, specifically in triple-cropped areas 
of Trung Phu B and Hung Binh. 
Other land use in the same area can affect 
fish culture. At Truong Xuan hamlet, the 
cultivation of lotuses for roots and seeds 
constrained the harvest by limiting the 
efficiency of harvesting methods in 2008 
and 2009.
Before the project, fishing in inundated 
rice fields was common for home 
consumption or to provide daily income. 
Fishing restrictions following project 
implementation were not well accepted 
by beneficiaries in D1 and Trung Phu 
B hamlets or by outsiders in D1 and C2 
hamlets in Vietnam and Thnal Kaeng 
village in Cambodia, who lost previous 
access rights, although alternative fishing 
grounds were available nearby. In D1, 15% 
of survey respondents, including project 
participants, cited the lack of access to 
fishing grounds as a harmful impact of the 
CBFC project, as did 18% of respondents 
in Trung Phu B. This was mainly a concern 
for households who usually fished for 
home consumption behind their houses. 
In Truong Xuan in 2009, the fish harvest 
triggered social conflict. Some landowners 
not involved in fish culture did not allow 
project participants to enter their land 
during the harvest, even where previous 
agreement existed. Landowners benefit 
from fish culture by harvesting both wild 
and cultured fish.
C2 and D1 hamlets in Vietnam were affected 
by poaching, according to interviewed 
project participants, 58% of whom at D1 
and 27% of whom at C2 ranked poaching 
as one of the main constraints. High rates of 
poaching by beneficiaries and others alike 
were explained by the difficulty of policing 
large areas measuring 48 ha and 65 ha 
at night, compounded by their previously 
open access nature. At other sites in 
Vietnam, poaching was not highlighted as 
a constraint. Rivers provided alternative 
fishing grounds at Trung Phu B and Hung 
Binh hamlets, and the site at Truong Xuan 
hamlet was, according to farmers, not 
productive or heavily fished before the 
project. 
Poaching happened at only one site in 
Bangladesh, Angrar Beel, where the accused 
were participants involved in guarding 
the site and related to the president of the 
FMC. 
In Cambodia, beneficiaries at Thnal Kaeng 
village reported poaching and vandalism, 
as the project site was in a public reservoir 
previously open to fishers. All beneficiaries 
and 30% of other respondents claim that 
fishers deliberately damaged the fence to 
allow fish to escape. 
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At Chroy Paon village, where the project site 
included a private rice field and a pond with 
multiple owners, 60% of beneficiaries cited 
vandalism as the main constraint on CBFC. 
The conflict originated in the multiple use 
and users of the pond. The pond included 
in the project was previously used by one 
of the owners for rice irrigation, watering 
livestock and rearing ducks, which created 
conflict after the first year of fish culture. 
In the second year of the project, the 
pond was divided into two parts, one for 
fish culture and the other for private use. 
The pond owner and project beneficiaries 
could not agree on water and pond usage, 
and the resulting conflict saw the fence 
vandalized, allowing fish to escape and 
suppressing fish production.
In all project countries, governance 
mechanisms showed their limited ability to 
control poaching and other misbehavior. 
It is important to balance power in the 
beneficiary group and, where there are 
multiple resource users, agree on land and 
water use. 
4.8 MARKETS AND ECONOMIC 
VIABILITY
INFLUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL 
MARKETS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF 
RICE
With the liberalization of the economy and 
the intensification of rice culture, Vietnam 
became the world’s second-largest rice 
exporter in the early 1990s. The national 
market is therefore influenced by fluctuation 
of international rice prices. In April 2008, 
for example, domestic rice prices rose 10% 
within a week to record a 45% gain over the 
January 2008 price (TopNews.in 2008). The 
price of rice affects the relative profitability 
of aquaculture. Higher rice prices induced 
individual farmers to intensify their rice 
culture, as was noted in Hung Binh hamlet, 
where most of the farmers decided to shift 
from two rice crops per year to three when 
the price for paddy increased from 4,000 
VND/kg to 6,000 VND/kg.
In Bangladesh, lower rice prices in 2009 in 
the midst of the global food crisis influenced 
farmer strategies and land-use choices, 
inducing farmers to shift to aquaculture in 
areas where seed, knowledge and other 
inputs were available, as observed at 
Kalmina Beel. 
ACCESS TO MARKETS 
The presence of a market for distribution of 
culture products is crucial to the success 
of any fish culture enterprise. However, 
it was found that market factors were an 
important constraint in the development of 
viable, profitable, fish culture. 
In Cambodia, smaller size fish were marketed 
in villages for a retail price of $1.50-2.00/
kg, which was higher than wholesale price, 
according to beneficiaries. Marketing was 
an important constraint in Vietnamese 
project sites, with low market prices for 
cultured fish during the fish harvest period 
and trading of a large quantity of fish, with 
big head carp sold at $0.22/kg, silver 
carp at $0.34/kg and common carp sold 
at $0.20-0.40/kg. In Bangladesh, where 
the size of the fish trade is similar to that 
of Vietnam at more than 20 million tons, 
marketing was not found to be problematic. 
The involvement of professional fishers 
in the group ensured good techniques 
in harvesting and processing fish for the 
wholesale market. Beneficiaries reported 
average selling prices of $1.04/kg for 
common carp, $0.69/kg for big head carp 
and $0.63/kg for silver carp between 2006 
and 2008 and benefiting from a more 
competitive market than in Vietnam, where 
marketing is done by contract with a few 
fish traders during a short period when fish 
prices are at their lowest. 
MARKET PRICES THAT PROVIDE A 
RETURN ON INVESTMENT
Alternative marketing with early sequential 
harvest using long fence trap nets before the 
bulk of harvest did not provide significant 
results, accounting for only 6% of the gross 
return at Truong Xuan hamlet. At all sites in 
Vietnam, economic results were limited by 
marketing constraints and fish market price 
fluctuation. Marketing was ranked as a 
main constraint by 26% of respondents at 
D1 hamlet, 33% at C2, 18% at Trung Phu B 
and 33% at Truong Xuan. Low market price 
and the marketing of large amounts of fish 
through traders in a short period lowered 
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the selling price. Alternative marketing with 
early sequential harvest using long fence 
trap nets before the bulk of harvest did not 
provide significant results, accounting for 
only 6% of the gross return at Truong Xuan 
hamlet. 
AVAILABILITY OF COST EFFECTIVE, 
HIGH QUALITY INPUTS
In both Vietnam and Bangladesh, 
information, fingerlings and other inputs 
are easily available. In both countries, 
aquaculture development is supported by 
a growing market, extension services and a 
dynamic private sector. In Bangladesh, the 
DoF is the main public agency in charge 
of aquaculture development, together with 
13 other agencies. Seven public 
organizations  support  aquaculture at 
different administrative levels in Vietnam. 
Private sector development and market 
integration have been key factors in 
successful aquaculture development 
in both Bangladesh and Vietnam. In 
Bangladesh, more than 98% of fish seed 
is produced by the private sector (DoF 
2007). In Vietnam the development of 
catfish production was made possible by 
the production of 15 billion fish fry by 500 
private fish hatcheries. In both countries, 
the integration of the value chain has 
made national and international markets 
accessible to local producers.
However, in Cambodia, the cost and 
availability of inputs for fish culture, 
particularly fingerlings, was also a limiting 
factor. During project implementation in 
Cambodia, access to high-quality seed 
was difficult and even delayed stocking. In 
Prey Veng and Takeo provinces, only one 
public hatchery and eight private or farmer-
run hatcheries function in each province, 
producing 2.4 million fingerlings in Prey 
Veng in 2004 and 3.1 million in Takeo. The 
average price of fingerlings stocked during 
the project is higher in Cambodia, at $3.55-
4.71/kg, than in Vietnam, at $2.01-2.88/
kg. The lowest average fingerling price 
was found in Bangladesh, at $1.14-1.41/
kg. Thus, fingerlings cost three times more 
in Cambodia than in Bangladesh, and the 
average fingerling size smaller, at 11 grams 
each compared with more than 30 grams 
in Bangladesh. This reflects a considerable 
difference in fingerling market development 
between the two countries. 
4.9 TECHNICAL ISSUES AND 
IMPLEMENTATION
SITE SIzE AND LOCATION
Beneficiaries identified site size and location 
as important factors contributing to fish 
culture success. In Vietnam, sites in rice 
fields are usually adjacent to homesteads, 
facilitating fish-culture activities. Only at 
Hung Binh hamlet were homesteads far 
from project site, which was considered a 
constraint as close proximity to the culture 
site makes guarding more practical. At Pom 
Eith village in Cambodia, the site in 2007 was 
found to be too far from the village, at 1.5 
kilometers, and was relocated closer to the 
village in 2008 to facilitate the night watch. 
Similarly at Thnal Kaeng, a project site was 
selected close to beneficiaries’ houses. 
The size of the enclosure was found to be 
problematic at several places in Vietnam. In 
Truong Xuan, 33% of respondents found 90 
ha too large for 13 participants to harvest. 
In 2009, the area was enlarged to 120 ha 
with only 7 participants, requiring the group 
to hire labor for the harvest. At C2 hamlet, 
22% of respondents considered 48 ha too 
large for 28 beneficiaries. At D1 hamlet, 
40% of respondents stated that an area 
smaller than the existing 65 ha would be 
easier to protect from poaching. 
SIzE OF STOCKED FINGERLINGS
In selecting the most appropriate size of 
fish for stocking in flooded areas, farmers 
had to make important trade-offs between 
the cost of investing in larger fingerlings, 
which are less vulnerable to predation 
and mortality, and increasing the financial 
returns by selecting smaller size fingerlings. 
Farmers were also constrained by the 
availability of fingerlings at the time of 
stocking. However, as a result of stocking 
smaller size fingerlings, the presence 
of predatory fish in the enclosure after 
fingerling stocking became a significant 
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technical constraint for all respondents 
at Thnal Kaeng and Chroy Proan villages 
in Cambodia. At Truong Xuan hamlet 
in Vietnam, the stocked common carp 
fingerlings were small at 1.54 grams each, 
and only 6.6% survived predation by self-
recruited species. The fingerling survival 
rate in Vietnam in 2007 and 2008 averaged 
13-33% at various sites, with fingerlings 
weighing 2.97-8.31 grams. In Bangladesh, 
the survival rate was better at 35-51% using 
fingerlings weighing 36.4-49.0 grams. 
Beneficiaries at Beel Mail in Bangladesh 
compared their first experience of CBFC 
without technical support in 2005 with the 
present situation. The difference in survival 
rate and production between 2005 and later 
years was explained by better selection of 
fingerling size, selective harvesting and 
bamboo fencing at water inlets and outlets. 
Fingerlings larger than 30 grams brought 
better results than the smaller fingerlings 
used in 2005. At other sites in Bangladesh, 
technical support improved the model with 
better fish species selection at Angrar Beel 
and longer grow-out periods at Kalmina 
Beel.
APPROPRIATE FENCING AND 
ENCLOSURE TECHNOLOGY 
Fencing and other protection of the culture 
site from vandalism and sudden flooding 
was a main technical constraint. Net fencing 
was a costly $1,147 at Truong Xuan hamlet 
and $105-189 at Cambodian project sites, 
and it is more easily damaged and difficult 
to maintain than dikes like those found at 
Pom Eith, Chroy Poan and Thnal Kaeng 
in Cambodia and Truong Xuan hamlet in 
Vietnam. At Pom Eith, beneficiaries decided 
to change the location of the enclosure, 
preferring to use an area with a higher dike 
to reduce the need for fragile net fencing. 
In Bangladesh, the use of bamboo fencing 
instead of net requires more work but 
offers the advantage of allowing naturally 
occurring fry to migrate into the site while 
blocking the entry of large predatory fish. 
Bamboo also allows better water exchange 
with the floodplain and, according to rice 
farmers, does not modify the deposit of 
alluvium in rice fields, unlike in Vietnam, 
where systems of dikes and culverts seem 
to limit sediment deposit and the natural 
renewal of fertility in rice fields over the 
years. 
TECHNICAL EXPERIENCE OF FISHERS
As noted above, the lack of labor in 
Vietnam made harvesting problematic. In 
Bangladesh, by contrast, the involvement 
of professional fishers, who keep 50% 
of the self-recruited catch and 15-20% 
of the cultured catch, allows an efficient 
fish harvest. Moreover, in Vietnam, the 
absence of professional fishers with their 
own harvesting gear and the consequent 
need to rent gear for $114 at Trung Xuan 
and $430 at C2 was found to be expensive. 
Professional fishers also bring skills that 
other beneficiaries lack. Some beneficiaries 
in Vietnam preferred to allocate their time to 
preparing rice fields instead of participating 
in the fish harvest. 
4.10 INCENTIVES FOR UPTAKE 
AND ADOPTION
The economic viability of fish culture is the 
strongest incentive to pursue community-
based fish culture. In Vietnam, the incentive 
to join the project was mainly economic, 
as 95% of respondents at D1 hamlet and 
73% at C2 joined the project to increase 
their income during the flood season, 
expecting income of up to $117/household, 
or more than the value of fishing for home 
consumption or renting land out for duck 
rearing. At other sites, the expectation 
of increased income was less important 
(52% of respondents at Trung Phu B and 
38% at Hung Binh). However, economic 
benefits from fish culture have not matched 
expectations or been able to compete with 
other income-generating activities. This 
outcome is primarily a result of the low 
market value of fish at the time of ha rvest 
in Vietnam, which is dictated by the start of 
the next rice cultivation period. Lower than 
expected financial benefits prompted 68% 
of beneficiaries at D1 hamlet, 78% at C2, 
76% at Trung Phu B and 44% at Truong 
Xuan to quit the project. At Choy Proan 
village in Cambodia, 40% of participants to 
chose discontinue fish culture. 
In the Mekong Delta, November and early 
December see the volume of capture 
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fishery trade rise to an average of 1,040 kg/
day in the market at Muong Luon in Dong 
Thap Province, sharply up from 601 kg/day 
in the dry season (Vu et al. 2007). In five 
markets in the Mekong Delta, from 56% 
to 92% of traded fish comes from capture 
fisheries at this season, with only 32% to 
59% coming from capture fisheries in the 
dry season. The abundance of fish at this 
time of year forces down fish market prices 
to $0.34/kg for common carp (Cyprinus 
carpio) from $1.14/kg in the dry season, 
and less than $0.28/kg for big head carp 
(Hypophthalmichthys nobilis).
In contrast, at Kalmina Beel and Beel 
Mail in Bangladesh the economic results 
for individuals improved with the project. 
In Bangladesh, it was important that 
landowners could also benefit from fish 
culture, as flooded rice fields provided 
no benefits before the project. At Kalmina 
Beel, landowners were able to gain $72.60/
ha in 2008, and moneylending landowners 
at Beel Mail increased their income by 
25%. The landless reaped a net benefit of 
$2.20/participant from the improved fish 
catch with restricted access for previous 
users. At Beel Mail, the landless can catch 
250-2,000 grams of fish per day, many 
times the 50 grams/day caught before the 
project.
Fishers are the main beneficiaries at Beel 
Mail, increasing their income with their 
share of the net benefit and of the harvest. 
On average, fishers claim to earn $103-294 
each, compared with $14-73 previously. 
Similarly at Kalmina Beel, fisher’s income 
rose from $29-36/household/year to $59-
73/person/year. At Beel Mail and Kalmina 
Beel, participants cited increased income 
for all beneficiaries as the main impact. 
Compared with other opportunities like 
off-farm labor, earning $2.20/day, CBFC is 
more lucrative. Moreover, the successful 
result at Beel Mail and Kalmina Beel 
created opportunities for beneficiaries to 
diversify their incomes. At Beel Mail, more 
than 20 households are now involved in 
potato or fingerling trading. At Kalimina 
Beel, 10-12 households started fingerling 
nurseries. Economic incentives are 
important for the continuance of collective 
action in Bangladesh, with all stakeholders 
benefiting from the project. 
FOOD SECURITY INCENTIVES 
In Cambodia, cultured fish are harvested in 
the dry season, after the peak of wild fish 
harvest, to secure higher prices averaging 
$1.50-2.00/kg or even higher. However, 
ncreased fish production and access to 
cheaper fish during off-peak harvest season 
was an important incentive in Cambodia, 
as 80% of respondents at Chroy Poan 
village and 20% at Pom Eith expecting 
to increase their fish consumption. In 
Bangladesh, improved fish stocks and 
communities’ access to cheaper fish were 
important incentives. Fishing was not totally 
restricted in Bangladesh, but this regulatory 
difference reflected local fishing practice. 
The Bangladeshi use of extensive fishing 
gear like push nets or trap nets to catch 
only self-recruited species is uncommon in 
Vietnam, where most use long fence trap 
nets or gill nets, which do not restrict the 
catch to self-recruited species. 
IMPROVEMENT OF RICE YIELD AND 
WATER MANAGEMENT 
Farmers noticed several positive impacts 
in Bangladesh and Vietnam, where fish 
culture takes place in large rice fields. At 
both Angrar Beel and Beel Mail, landowners 
have found fish culture to improve rice yield 
by 10-20%. However, these results are 
unverified farmers’ claims and follow only 
few years of fish culture, affecting two rice 
crops at Beel Mail and one at Angrar Beel. 
At Kalmina Beel, the impact on rice farming 
is a main factor that attracts farmers to 
CBFC. The dry season rice crop and, 
to a lesser extent, the rainy season rice 
crop benefited from the improved water 
management necessary for fish culture. 
Early in the dry season, longer water 
storage allows irrigation during the first 
step of rice culture in January. Before the 
improvement of the water management 
infrastructure, the flood plain was drained 
earlier in the season and affected by flash 
floods in April, damaging the rice crop at 
the flowering or maturing stage. During 
the rainy season, rice culture on areas not 
inundated can benefit from irrigation at 
the critical flowering stage when there is a 
drought. 
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Rice culture benefited from the project at 
two sites in Vietnam, C2 and D1 hamlets, 
with improved dike systems. A better dike 
system in Vietnam allows earlier drainage 
and an early winter rice crop, which fetches 
a higher selling price. In addition, farmers in 
these hamlets expected to cultivate a third 
rice crop with a better flood-protection 
system. 
CHANGE IN SOIL STRUCTURE, 
FERTILITY, PEST AND WEED DENSITY, 
AND THE RICE CROPPING CALENDAR 
Fish culture is thought to improve the 
fertility of rice fields while suppressing 
weeds and pests. However, Vietnamese 
participants found it to reduce rice yield 
as it encouraged golden apple snail, a 
rice pest, by preventing their collection 
by villagers and fishermen, according 
to 38% of respondents at Hung Binh 
hamlet, 26% at C2, 25% at D1 and 12% 
at Trung Phu B. Fish culture interfered 
with rice field leveling, according to 7% 
of respondents at C2 hamlet and 35% 
at Trung Phu B. Lower alluvium deposit 
because of reduced water exchange was 
cited by 15% of respondents at D1 hamlet 
and 6% at Trung Phu B hamlets. Delay in 
rice seeding was a complaint of 10% of 
respondents at D1 and 18% at Trung Phu 
B. At C2, 33% of respondents stated that 
fish culture harmed rice yield. However, 
as there was no control site outside the 
area, a relationship between fish culture 
and rice field could not be confirmed. 
It is also possible the lower yield could 
reflect interannual variation arising from 
other causes such as weather. 26% of 
respondents at C2 hamlet and 36% at D1 
reported that fish culture suppressed rice 
field weeds. A similar effect was described 
at Truong Xuan.
TECHNICAL SUPPORT
Technical support from WorldFish and/
or local project partners was highlighted 
as important incentive at the three sites in 
Bangladesh and at the villages of Chroy 
Poan and Pom Eith in Cambodia. For 30% 
of the beneficiaries at Pom Eith and 40% 
at Chroy Poan, the incentive to join the 
project was to gain access to aquaculture 
knowledge, and links to government and 
development agencies. Chroy Poan has 
seen the establishment of five new privately 
owned ponds using improved extensive 
culture systems since the beginning of the 
project in 2008. Villagers also benefited from 
the presence of development agencies. 
The development of individual aquaculture 
is the main impact of the project for 90% of 
the project beneficiaries and 71% of others 
interviewed. One hypothesis is that the 
presence of the project and its technicians, 
and the resulting access to knowledge and 
inputs, reduced the risk local farmers faced 
in changing their production systems. At 
Truong Xuan hamlet in Vietnam and at 
Kalmina Beel in Bangladesh, gaining access 
to local administrators and politicians 
for purposes other than for fish culture, 
such as requesting road improvements, 
provided an incentive to participate in the 
fish culture project.  
4.11 DISINCENTIVES
CHALLENGES OF COLLECTIVE ACTION
In Cambodia and Vietnam there was a clear 
lack of incentives to attract individuals to 
collective action. At C2 and Hung Binh 
hamlets, all respondents highlighted 
the difficulty of implementing collective 
action. At Trung Phu B hamlet, 53% of 
the respondents found no advantage to 
working collectively. 
In Cambodia, most participants in 
implementation meetings at Thnal Kaeng 
clearly expressed their desire to start 
individual aquaculture, as they were not 
interested in collective action. At Chroy 
Poan, 30% of group participants and 
all others interviewed did not see any 
advantage of working together. At Thnael 
Kaeng, farmers clearly explained that the 
main consideration when starting an activity 
is independence from their neighbors 
and other farmers, and ownership of 
production. At this last village, resistance 
to collective action was explained by the 
lack of trust among members regarding 
work duties, poaching and inequity in 
benefit sharing. Further production arising 
from collective action did not belong to 
individuals but to the group, which was a 
familiar Vietnamese approach of collective 
action. This individualistic behavior clearly 
37 researCh Findings
brought little social cohesion and limited the 
implementation of collective or community 
action. 
CONTRIBUTION OF TIME OR MONEY TO 
PARTICIPATE
In order to create a sense of ownership, 
and to encourage sustainability beyond the 
project lifetime, beneficiaries were required 
to make a contribution either in the form 
of their own time and labour for dike 
maintenance, providing poles or bamboo 
for fencing, or a monetary contribution. At 
Chroy Poan village in Cambodia, villagers 
paid $5 each to join the group, and 20% 
of the nonparticipants interviewed in 
this village explained that this monetary 
contribution was beyond their means. 
In Potamon, Thnal Kaeng and Pom Eith 
villages, the contribution of $2.50-3.00 
worth of bamboo per participant and labor 
to create the fence was also considered 
too high for villagers, who preferred to use 
their time for more lucrative activities. 
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5 Lesson LeARned And ReCommendAtIons   
 FoR CoLLeCtIVe AquACuLtuRe In seAsonAL   
 FLoodpLAIns
CBFC can provide animal protein and 
income diversification during the flood 
season and benefit various resource users. 
However, like other community-based 
activities, this model is fragile. Its success 
and sustainability depend on several 
interacting factors. 
Technical, economic, social and 
governance aspects are important, but the 
method of implementation and the agro-
ecological and socioeconomic context 
has to be taken in account. The following 
section synthesizes findings to identify 
the lessons learned in developing CBFC. 
Challenges and enabling factors and their 
interactions are presented in Figures 5 and 
6. 
5.1 GOVERNANCE, POLICY 
AND INSTITUTIONS
The following are the lessons learned 
regarding governance, policy and 
institutions:
CBFC can be more easily established where 
aquaculture is already developed. 
•	 A	 strong	 national	 policy	 supporting	
aquaculture at the field level can ensure 
access to inputs such as fingerlings 
and knowledge at limited cost and 
without much constraint. Differences 
in aquaculture development in 
Bangladesh, Cambodia and Vietnam 
clearly show that CBFC is adapted 
to areas where aquaculture is well 
developed. 
•	 A	 national	 policy	 for	 developing	water-
management systems can promote fish 
culture in large flooded areas, as in the 
Mekong Delta of Vietnam. 
•	 Land	 use	 during	 the	 flood	 season	
depends on national and regional 
rice markets and national policy, as 
higher rice prices trigger a shift from 
two to three rice cropping per year, 
thus limiting the fish culture period. In 
Vietnam, the integration of fish culture 
on rice fields necessitates cooperation 
between fish and rice farmers regarding 
irrigation and drainage. Moreover, rice 
intensification can affect water quality 
regionally, as in the Plain of Reeds in 
Vietnam, where acidification early in the 
rainy season constrains aquaculture. 
•	 The	previous	experience	of	beneficiaries,	
institutional stakeholders and 
development agencies in community 
or collective approaches to fishery 
management can be tapped to promote 
such systems. However, previous 
collective experiences in Vietnam and 
Cambodia that were unsuccessful 
have been seen to discourage farmers 
from joining new community-based 
initiatives. 
•	 Strong	governance	within	communities	
is important to create trust. In Vietnam 
and Bangladesh, mechanisms to 
promote transparency and control 
poaching were found to be necessary, 
as is trusted leadership. Here 
governance aspects link with social 
and economic aspects, as competition 
for the same space in Vietnam caused 
conflict with previous users of the area. 
Access can be restricted for previous 
users if other fishing grounds are 
readily available. Good governance also 
requires the effective communication 
of project goals and that regulations 
be disseminated to non-beneficiaries 
and previous users of the resource. 
Vietnamese experience shows that an 
effective system to control poaching is 
required, including law enforcement by 
local authorities. Otherwise, excluding 
previous users of the area usually 
generates conflict, which then demands 
revised regulations to allow limited use 
of the area. One way to avoid conflict 
with the landless and fisher previous 
users is to include them in the project, 
as was found in Bangladesh.
•	 Agreement	 and	cooperation	 is	 needed	
with other land users in the fish culture 
area regarding the cropping calendar, 
access and other issues, especially 
where no other agricultural land is 
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available, as in Vietnam. Governance in 
Vietnam may also depend on social links 
in the community, as kinship can create 
sufficient trust among participants to 
allow good governance, transparency 
and effective mechanisms against 
poaching. 
5.2 ECONOMY AND MARKETS
•	 For	 individuals,	 economic	 incentives	
are important. Beneficiaries need to 
compare the cost, return and risk of 
different agricultural options to assess 
the relative profitability of the model in 
the local context.
•	 Areas	 with	 low	 wage	 rates	 and	 few	
employment opportunities have greater 
potential for CBFC, as beneficiaries see 
higher economic incentives. However, 
the seasonal migration typical of such 
areas has to be taken into account, 
especially where the flood season is 
synonymous with local inactivity and 
therefore with out-migration. 
•	 A	national	policy	promoting	aquaculture	
is important for market and economic 
viability. Even if the model uses extensive 
culture with few inputs, access to 
inexpensive fingerlings is important 
for system profitability, as is access to 
markets. Aquaculture is well developed 
in the Mekong Delta, with knowledge 
and inputs readily accessible, but 
marketing cultured fish at the same 
time as the peak of the wild fish harvest 
depresses prices and undercuts the 
economic returns of fish culture. 
•	 Low	 economic	 results	 compared	 with	
other options or the previous use of 
the area discourages households and 
individuals from continuing fish culture. 
In Vietnam, economic returns from 
inundated rice fields is important for 
household incomes and food security. 
The area is used in different ways during 
the flood season, unlike in Bangladesh 
or Cambodia, where farmers have 
access to land that is not inundated. 
Economic profitability is key to the 
success and continuance of the model, 
which makes it dependant on the 
socioeconomic context. Some areas 
previously unsuitable because of the 
high cost of fingerlings or weak market 
linkage can become economically 
suitable in the future. 
One lesson learned from experiments in 
Vietnam is the importance of rice culture 
compared with fish culture. Farmers 
consider fish culture complementary to 
rice culture, which is their main priority. 
In this case, incentives for farmers to 
implement and continue fish culture have 
to include improved rice field environment 
and water management with better flood-
protection systems achieved through 
project implementation. 
5.3 SOCIAL AND MOTIVATION 
ISSUES 
Interest in the project and participants’ 
involvement in community organization 
are important. In Cambodia and Vietnam, 
beneficiaries’ lack of involvement in project 
activities reflects other employment 
and land-use opportunities, as well as 
participation being restricted to landowners. 
In Bangladesh, fishers and the landless are 
employed by the project and find attractive 
livelihood opportunities in CBFC. Inclusive 
beneficiary selection can avoid technical 
constraints and social conflict. 
Conflicts with previous users and other 
land uses was problematic in Vietnam, 
with priority given to rice culture by farmers 
and national policy for rice intensification, 
and social and governance issues closely 
linked to the ago-ecological context. 
The lack of social cohesion was highlighted 
as a major constraint at several sites, 
with conflict appearing during group 
management and collective decisions 
sometimes failing to find acceptance. In 
Vietnam, fewer conflicts and more effective 
management were found where strong 
social ties linked beneficiaries, with more 
than 80% of participants in the same clan. 
5.4 ENVIRONMENTAL AND 
TECHNICAL ISSUES
Flood patterns, water management 
infrastructure and land use determine 
the duration of fish culture. These 
factors together with fingerlings size and 
the presence of predatory fish mainly 
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determine system productivity and the 
size of harvested fish. Marketing and the 
economic sustainability of the system 
demand that fish reach market size. 
Lessons from Vietnamese and Cambodian 
sites show that, when the cropping 
calendar and flood duration restrict 
the growing period to 5 months, large 
fingerling and proper fingerling nursing are 
required. Flood length and its interannual 
variability are important. In Cambodia and 
Vietnam, the flood can be delayed and 
flood amplitude is difficult to predict, with 
some years being too low and others too 
high. The model therefore dependants on 
the natural environment, all the more so 
in Cambodia, where water-management 
infrastructure is poorly developed. Net 
fencing is not appropriate for an entire 
site; dikes and embankments are preferred 
to avoid flood damage, water run off and 
vandalism.
The production site has to be located near 
homesteads to facilitate management and 
security. Its size should accord with the 
number of beneficiaries, considering labor 
constraints, particularly at  harvest time. 
Experience in Vietnam finds that no more 
than 2 hectares should be cultured per 
participant. 
The impact of fish culture on rice culture 
must be considered. The project was too 
short to clearly indicate the ecological 
impact of fish culture on rice field fertility, 
pest management and yields. However, 
discussions with farmers in Bangladesh 
and Vietnam indicate that this effect is 
important. In Bangladesh, the improvement 
of water-management systems and the 
consequent benefits to the rice production 
of direct project beneficiaries and others 
brought better acceptance of CBFC by 
non-beneficiaries. 
5.5 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
COLLECTIVE 
AQUACULTURE IN 
SEASONAL FLOODPLAINS
CBFC can be implemented in several ways 
and involve a variety of stakeholders. The 
model has to be adaptable to the agro-
ecological and socioeconomic context. 
The following factors should be taken into 
account during site selection.
Regarding the agro-ecological context,
•	 the	 flood	duration	must	be	 longer	 than	
5 months,
•	 the	agricultural	 calendar	must	not	 limit	
fish growth or the possibility of nursing 
fingerlings, and
•	 water-management	 infrastructure	 such	
as sluice gates and dikes are needed to 
control the water level and reduce the 
cost of net fencing.
Regarding the socioeconomic context,
•	 markets	 must	 be	 accessible	 and	 the	
harvest timed for acceptable prices for 
cultured fish,
•	 sufficient	labor	must	be	available	during	
fish culture (at least one participant for 
each 2 ha of cultured area),
•	 the	economic	 incentives	of	 fish	culture	
must compare favorably with other 
livelihood options, and
•	 previous	successful	collective	action	 in	
the community indicates the necessary 
social cohesion.
Attention should be paid to the following 
points during project implementation.
Regarding beneficiary selection, 
•	 previous	 users	 of	 the	 area	 should	 be	
included in the project to avoid conflict 
and poaching;
•	 where	collective	action	is	unpopular,	as	
in Vietnam, the selection of beneficiaries 
may best be narrowed to kinship groups 
and relatives for higher social cohesion; 
and
•	 labor	 shortage	 can	 be	 avoided	 by	
integrating the landless and fisher 
previous users of the area.
Regarding governance and management,
•	 mechanisms	for	transparent	management	
and poaching control must be developed 
in collaboration with project beneficiaries 
and
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•	 developing	 regulations	 to	 improve	
transparency promotes social cohesion 
and participation.
Regarding economic aspects,
•	 marketing	 can	 be	 improved	 with	
selective multiple harvesting, which 
requires strong market linkage, and
•	 storing	 cultured	 fish	 in	 ponds	 or	 early	
harvesting may be options in the 
Mekong Delta to avoid having the 
harvest coincide with the peak harvest 
of wild-caught fish.
Regarding technical aspects,
•	 floodplains	 seem	 to	 be	 well	 suited	 for	
common carp and big head carp, but 
more valuable species may not be 
adapted to such extensive systems and 
can create incentives for poaching and
•	 large	 fingerlings	 are	 preferable,	 even	
at a significantly higher cost, to control 
predation and reach market size more 
quickly. 
To succeed, CBFC has to integrate good 
governance and technical suitability 
in favorable socioeconomic and agro-
ecological contexts. Not all floodplains 
are appropriate. Results from Cambodia 
and Vietnam confirm that a major focus in 
implementing CBFC is governance, while 
technical issues are also crucial. Difficult 
and complex as CBFC is, experience in 
Bangladesh shows that, where suitable, it 
can provide substantial benefits. 
42 
CondiTions For ColleCTiVe aCTion: 
undersTanding FaCTors supporTing and ConsTraining CommuniTy-Based Fish CulTure in Bangladesh, CamBodia and VieTnam
6. ReFeRenCes
Ali MH, Miah MNI, Elahi MN. 1998. Increasing farm 
income by incorporating fish culture in deepwater 
rice environment. Bangladesh Journal of 
Fisheries Research 2(2):183-188.
Asian Development Bank. 2005. An evaluation of 
small-scale freshwater rural aquaculture 
development for poverty reduction. Manila: 
Operations Evaluation Department, Asian 
Development Bank. ISBN 071-561-550-3. 164 
p.
Catling D. 1992. Rice in deep water. Los Banos, 
Philippines: International Rice Research Institute. 
542 p.
De Silva SS. 2003. Culture-based fisheries: An 
underutil ized opportunity in aquaculture. 
Aquaculture 221:221-243.
De Silva SS, Amarasinghe US, Nguyen TTT (eds). 
2006. Better practice approaches to culture-
based fisheries development in Asia. ACIAR 
Monograph 120. Canberra: Australian Centre 
for International Agricultural Research. 96 pp.
Dey MM, Bose ML, Alam MF. 2008. Recommendation 
domains for pond aquaculture. Country case 
study: Development and status of freshwater 
aquaculture in Bangladesh. WorldFish Center 
studies and reviews no. 1872. Penang, Malaysia: 
The WorldFish Center. 73 p.
Dey MM, Prein M. 2003. Participatory research at 
landscape level: Flood-prone ecosystems in 
Bangladesh and Vietnam. In: Pound B, Snapp 
S, McDougall C, Braun A (eds). Managing natural 
resources for sustainable livelihoods: Uniting 
science and participation. London: Earthscan. 
252 p.
Dey MM, Prein M, Mahfuzul Haque ABM, Sultana 
P, Dan NC, Hao NV. 2005. Economic feasibility 
of the community based fish culture in seasonally 
flooded rice fields in Bangladesh and Vietnam. 
Aquaculture Economics & Management 9:65-
88.
DoF. 2007. Fishery stat ist ical yearbook of 
Bangladesh. Dhaka: Department of Fisheries, 
Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock.
Gillinson, S., 2004. Why Cooperate? A Multi-
Disciplinary Study of Collective Action. Working 
paper no. 234. Overseas Development Institute, 
London.
Hoa LVT, Nhan NH, Wolanski E, Cong TT, Shigeko 
H. 2007. The combined impact  on the flooding 
in Vietnam’s Mekong River delta of local 
man-made structures, sea level rise, and dams 
upstream in the river catchment. Estuarine 
Coastal Shelf Science 71:110-116.
Hong, M.C. 2010. China Country Report. WorldFish 
Center, Penang, Malaysia.
ICLARM and IFM. 1998. Analysis of co-management 
arrangements in fisheries and related coastal 
resources: A research framework. Manila: 
International Center for Living Aquatic Resources 
Management and Denmark: Institute for 
Fisheries Management, North Sea Center.
IIRR. 2000. Rice-fish culture in deepwater rice 
farming system. CITY: International Institute of 
Rural Reconstruction.
Kakonen M. 2008. Mekong Delta at the crossroads: 
More control or adaptation? Ambio 37(3):205-
212.
Le Coq J-F, Trébuil G, Dufumier M. 2004. History 
of rice production in the Mekong Delta. In: 
Smallholders and stockbreeders: Histories of 
foodcrop and livestock farming in Southeast 
Asia. L. KITLV:163-185.
Lorenzen K, Garaway CJ, Chamsingh B, Warren 
TJ. 1998. Effects of access restrictions and 
stocking on small water body fisheries in Laos. 
J. Fish Biol. 53(Suppl. A):345–357.
Ministry of Fisheries. 2005. Progress report on 
aquaculture development in 2004 and solution 
for implementation of aquaculture development 
program in 2005. Hanoi: Ministry of Fisheries, 
Viet Nam. 15 p.
Ministry of Fisheries. 2006. Progress report on 
aquaculture development in 2005 and solution 
for implementation of aquaculture development 
program in 2006 of the North province. Hanoi: 
Ministry of Fisheries, Viet Nam. 15 p.
Mukhopadhyay PK, Das DN, Roy B. 1992. On-farm 
research in deepwater rice-fish culture in West 
Bengal, India. In: dela Cruz CR, Lightfoot C, 
Costa-Pierce BA, Carangal VR, Bimbao MP. 
Rice-fish research and development in Asia. 
pp 255–272. ICLARM Conference Proceedings 
24. Manila: International Center for Living 
Aquatic Resources Management. 457 p.
Nguyen SH, Bui AT, Le LT, Nguyen TTT, De Silva 
SS. 2001. The culture-based fisheries in small, 
farmer-managed reservoirs in two provinces of 
northern Vietnam: An evaluation based on three 
production cycles. Aquaculture Research 
32:975- 990.
Pillot D.  2007. Jardins et Rizieres du Cambodge. 
Paris: GRET-Karthala. 522 p.
Rothuis AJ, Nhan DK, Richter CJJ, Ollevier F. 
1998a. Rice with fish culture in the semi-deep 
waters of the Mekong delta, Vietnam: A 
socioeconomic survey. Aquaculture Research 
29:47-57.
Rothuis AJ, Nhan DK, Richter CJJ, Ollevier F. 
1998b. Rice with fish culture in the semi-deep 
waters of the Mekong delta, Vietnam: Interaction 
of rice culture and fish husbandry management 
on fish production. Aquaculture Research 
29:59-66.
Roy B, Das DN, Mukhopadhay PK. 1990. Rice-
fish-vegetable integrated farming: Towards a 
sustainable ecosystem. Naga (International 
43 reFerenCes
Cente r  fo r  L i v ing  Aquat ic  Resources 
Management quarterly) 13(4):17-18.
Russell,A., Coulibaly, S., Sinaba, F., Kodio, A., 
Joffre, O., and N. Sheriff. 2010. Institutional 
histories, seasonal floodplains (mares), and 
livelihood impacts of fish stocking in the Inner 
Niger River Delta of Mali. The WorldFish Center 
CBFC Working Paper No. 5. The WorldFish 
Center, Penang, Malaysia. 
Schlozman, K.L., Verba, S., and Brady, H.E.1995. 
‘Participation’s not a Paradox: the View from 
American Activists’, British Journal of Political 
Science 25:1
Sheriff, N., Joffre, O. Hong, M.C., Barman, B., 
Haque, A.B.M., Rahman, F.,  zhu, J., Nguyen 
van H., Russell, A., van Brakel, M., Valmonte-
Santos, R., Werthmann, C., and Kodio, A. 2010. 
Community-based Fish Culture in Seasonal 
Floodplains and Irrigation Systems. Final project 
report submitted to the Challenge Program on 
Water and Food. Available for download at 
http://www.waterandfood.org/page/Project-
Reports
Saphakdy B, Phomsouvanh A, Davy B, Nguyen 
TTT, de Silva SS. 2009. Contrasting community 
management and revenue sharing practices of 
culture based fisheries in Lao PDR. Aquaculture 
Asia Magazine 14(3):3-6.
Sinhababu DP, Ghosh BC, Panda MM,. Reddy 
BB. 1984. Some preliminary observations on 
physico-chemical characteristics of soil and 
water under rice-cum-fish culture. Journal of 
the Inland Fisheries Society of India 16(1&2):58-
61.
So N, Viseth H, Mov S, Navy H, Ka-Ming A. 2000. 
Overview of fish seed production in Cambodia. 
In: Proceedings of the national workshop on 
Cambodia’s fish seed production: Current status 
and logical framework analysis. Phnom Penh: 
Department of Fisheries. 11 p.
So N, Tong E, Norng S, Hortle K. 2005. Use of 
freshwater low value fish for aquaculture 
development in the Cambodia’s Mekong basin. 
Consu l tancy repor t  fo r  Mekong R iver 
Commission, Assessment of Mekong Capture 
Fisheries Project. Phnom Penh: Department of 
Fisheries. 34 p.
So, Haing L. 2007. An evaluation of freshwater 
fish seed resources in Cambodia, pp. 145-170. 
In: Bondad-Reantaso MG (ed). Assessment of 
freshwater fish seed resources for sustainable 
aquaculture. FAO fisheries technical paper no. 
501. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization. 
628 p.
Thompson, P., Sultana, P. & Islam, N., 2003. 
Lessons from community based management 
of floodplain fisheries in Bangladesh. Journal 
of Environmental Management, 69(3), 307-321.
TopNews.in. 2008. www.topnews.in/paddy-rice-
price-vietnam-rises-10-cent-week-237547.
Tubtim N, Hirsch P. 2005. Common property as 
enclosure: A case of a backswamp in southern 
Laos. Society and Natural Resources 18:41-60.
Vu VA, Tran KH, Phan TL. 2007. Monitoring sales 
of fish at retail markets in the Mekong delta. 
Fisheries ecology, valuation and mitigation 
component. Ho Chi Minh City: Mekong River 
Commission. 27 p.
Walker, Jack and King, David. 1992. ‘The Provision 
of Benefits by Interest Groups in the United 
States’, Journal of Politics, Volume 54.
Werthmann, C and Mai Thi Truc, Chi.2008.
Community-Based Aquaculture for Poverty 
Reduction: Institutional and Technical Options 
for Sustainable Resource Use. Presented at 
IIFET 2008, Nha Trang, Vietnam
WorldFish. 2002. Increasing and sustaining the 
productivity of fish and rice in flood-prone 
ecosystems in South and Southeast Asia. Final 
Report to the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development. Penang, Malaysia: The WorldFish 
Center. 
    
For further details contact:
The WorldFish Center
PO Box 500 GPO, 10670 Penang, Malaysia
email: worldfishcenter@cgiar.org
Authors: 
Olivier Joffre and Natasja Sheriff
This publication should be cited as: Joffre, O. ; Sheriff, N. 2011. Conditions for collective action: 
understanding factors supporting and constraining community-based fish culture in Bangladesh, 
Cambodia and Vietnam. WorldFish Center Studies and Reviews 2011-21. The WorldFish Center, 
Penang, Malaysia. 46 p.
© July 2011 The WorldFish Center. All rights reserved. This brief may be reproduced without the 
permission of, but with acknowledgment to, The WorldFish Center.
www.worldfishcenter.org
 
 
Reducing poverty and hunger by 
improving fisheries and aquaculture
